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INTRODUCTION
In 1985, the Internal Revenue Service (the “IRS”) seized Miriam Red-
stone and David Dillman’s 1969 Dodge, a car the couple had affectionately
named Dolly.1 The IRS seized and auctioned the car to offset Redstone and
Dillman’s federal income tax liability.2 Redstone and Dillman’s pacifist re-
ligious and moral beliefs required them to abstain from acts of war or acts
that supported war. They believed the federal government’s use of tax
money to support military spending violated those beliefs.3 Calling them-
selves war tax resisters, they refused to pay federal income taxes because
they believed that to pay their taxes would have been a sin.
The National War Tax Resistance Coordinating Committee4 estimates
the IRS spent $345 to auction Dolly, which sold to a friend of Redstone and
Dillman’s for $105. The friend promptly returned the car to Redstone and
Dillman, with a loss to the United States government of $240.5
War tax resisters like Redstone and Dillman face a difficult conun-
drum; they can either disobey the dictates of conscience or suffer the conse-
quences of non-payment of tax—everything from seizure of property, to
garnishment of wages, to arrest, to jail time.
Pacifist war tax resisters have claimed collection of tax for payment of
war violates their religious freedom under the First Amendment and, later,
under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act.6 Nevertheless, courts have
routinely held the Free Exercise Clause does not grant the right to be free
from taxation.7 Forcing pacifists to pay tax, when they believe it to be sin-
ful, belies the importance the nation places on its adherence to the ideal of
Free Exercise.
Currently, because of the Affordable Care Act (ACA), attention to the
tension between religious freedom and government regulations compelling
certain payments is high. But balancing the needs of religious pacifists (and
of war tax resisters in particular) against the economic requirements of the
country is a challenge that has faced legislators on American soil since
before the creation of the United States. Legislation resolving this issue
would solve the current conflict between pacifists’ rights to freely practice
their religion and the need of the country for revenue just as the exceptions
to the mandates of the ACA have solved the conflict between persons of
1. History of War Tax Resistance: The 1980’s, NAT’L WAR TAX RESISTANCE COORDINAT-
ING COMMITTEE, http://www.nwtrcc.org/history/history1980.php (last visited Sept. 22, 2014).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. While there is no centralized war tax resistance information storehouse, two groups have
served as a resource for war tax resisters: The National War Tax Resistance Coordinating Com-
mittee and the War Resisters League.
5. History of War Tax Resistance: The 1980’s, supra note 1.
6. See, e.g., Adams v. Comm’r, 170 F.3d 173, 175–76 (3d Cir. 1999).
7. See, e.g., id. at 178–80.
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religious faiths which prohibit the use of birth control and the need for the
American people to have health insurance.
The IRS is charged with somehow collecting funds from individuals
who feel facilitating that collection—even in the slightest—is a sin. Be-
cause war tax resisters believe that paying tax is a sin, they resist paying
taxes in novel and challenging ways, going to extremes to avoid compli-
ance. This is despite the fact that most war tax resisters would pay tax if
they felt they could do so without sinning.8 As the Redstone/Dillman case
demonstrates, it is likely that most of the IRS’ efforts to collect tax owed by
war tax resisters cost the government more than the government gains.9
Meanwhile, the country suffers a lack of revenue to which it is entitled.
Those who avoid payment of tax “deprive the country of resources it needs
to ensure its continued existence.”10
In response to these problems, several members of Congress have in-
troduced various versions of a “Peace Tax Fund” bill. The bill would allow
war tax resisters who qualify as pacifists to direct their tax money to a
separate fund not to be used for military spending. Despite some version of
this bill having been introduced in every congressional session since 1972,
the House Ways and Means committee has only held three hearings and the
bill has gained no traction.11
Now, however, the timing is right. The concessions made to concerns
of religious freedom by the ACA suggest the current administration is open
to the idea of carving out small, non-burdensome exceptions to laws of
universal applicability when necessary to protect genuine expressions of re-
ligious faith.12
8. Telephone Interview with Bob Runyan (Sept. 23, 2013).
9. It is difficult to establish what collection from war tax resisters costs the United States
government. Because war resisters object to tax and resist collection of tax with religious fervor,
they are more difficult to collect from than other types of tax resisters. While other resisters and/or
tax evaders may cave under the weight of government collection, many war resisters refuse to
comply with taxation at all, even under threat of jail. Anecdotal evidence suggests collecting from
resisters is costly—Redstone and Dillman’s case is one such example, and see the story of the
Kehlers later on. Additionally, the Joint Committee on Taxation has found altering the current tax
structure to avoid the collection/complicity problem by accommodating resisters would increase
revenue, which suggests, at a minimum, current structures are not effective. While resisters are
subject to penalties and fines which should offset the cost to the government of collection, resist-
ers often engage in absolute noncompliance, refusing to pay anything at all, and necessitating
further coercive collection practices, which are costly. It should be noted some resisters simply put
money aside and wait for the IRS to collect the money; for them, sin is avoided if the tax is paid
involuntarily. Even this less strenuous resistance costs the government time and energy to find and
collect the funds; however, funds resisters would pay if they could do so without violating their
religious beliefs.
10. Colleen M. Garrity, The Religious Freedom Peace Tax Fund Act: Becoming Conscious of
the Need to Accommodate Conscience, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 1229, 1231 (2003).
11. Id. at 1245 n.88.
12. See generally 45 C.F.R. § 147.131 (2014) (exempting religious employers from the re-
quirement to cover certain forms of birth control).
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This Article focuses on how the bill might be improved so that mem-
bers of Congress enact it. First, the bill needs to clearly define who qualifies
as a pacifist for tax purposes. By paralleling the already-existing conscien-
tious objector status used by the military, the revised bill could effectively
limit who might qualify as a war tax resister. Congress already allows con-
scientious objectors to military service to serve their countries in an alter-
nate, non-military form. Second, the bill must also direct the funds after
collection so as to avoid the charge that citizens might be legislating
through their tax returns. This bill would simply allow those who are con-
scientious objectors to taxation to fund the country via an alternate, non-
military fund, which Congress could use for any non-military purpose.
This Article—and the bill for which it provides revisions—deals ex-
clusively with war tax resisters motivated by religious conscience, and does
not address tax evaders or those politically opposed to tax collection, who
would not qualify for protection under a religious freedom argument. Addi-
tionally, the bill this Article proposes does not deal with war tax resisters
who choose to earn below the taxable income level—the only legal way,
currently, for a war tax resister (or any taxpayer) to avoid a federal income
tax liability—nor those war tax resisters who resist by filing a tax form,
paying in full, and including a statement that they are doing so under du-
ress. Rather, this Article deals only with war tax resisters who file their tax
returns and withhold all or part of the funds owed on the basis that paying
the tax would amount to an act of sin.
Section I defines the term “war tax resister” and explains the difficul-
ties of conscience faced by war tax resisters. Section II suggests the U.S.
military’s definitions of conscientious objector (both current and past) could
be used to determine conscientious objector status under the revised bill.
Section III traces the history of war tax resistance, which puts the purpose
of the bill in perspective by explaining the difficulty the IRS has faced in
collecting tax from war tax resisters and the difficulties war tax resisters
have faced in avoiding complicity with war, which they see as sin. Section
IV discusses the relevant case law and why, thus far, war tax resisters
claiming constitutional protection against tax collection have been unsuc-
cessful, making passage of the Religious Freedom Peace Tax Fund Bill (as
it is currently called) necessary. Section V explains the history of the Relig-
ious Freedom Peace Tax Fund Bill, and Section VI suggests changes that
might ensure passage of the revised Bill.
I. WHAT DOES IT MEAN FOR A WAR TAX RESISTER
TO BE COMPLICIT WITH SIN?
The U.S. military recognizes an exception to draft requirements for
pacifists, granting persons able to establish the sincerity of their beliefs the
title of conscientious objector and permitting them to perform “alternate
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service.”13 Since the draft has ended, it would seem there is no need for the
conscientious objector status; with an all-volunteer army, Congress cannot
currently be compelling citizens to participate in war against their religious
consciences.
War tax resisters disagree, feeling that being compelled to provide
monetary support is participation in war and is against their religious be-
liefs.14 In this way, the war tax resisters argument mirrors that of the Little
Sisters of the Poor, who claim being required by the ACA to pay for birth
control violates their religious beliefs.15
The decision to become a war tax resister is long and complex, espe-
cially in light of the consequences of noncompliance with the tax code.
Henry David Thoreau, in his essay “Civil Disobedience,” expresses the ten-
sion a war tax resister feels when torn between his conscience and his gov-
ernment and accurately outlines the modern revenue issues that arise from
war tax resistance. Describing the tension between law and conscience,
Thoreau urges those opposed to war and slavery, which he calls “twin injus-
tices,” to refrain from paying tax,16 telling them to be “men first[ ] and
subjects afterward.”17 The mere fact that one may vote against a law that
violates one’s conscience does not absolve the voter if he later complies
with the law.18 He urges his audience to join him in resisting unjust laws by
telling them, “Cast your whole vote, not a strip of paper merely, but your
whole influence.”19 Thoreau says he wants only to avoid the violation of his
own conscience which would occur were he compelled to support injus-
tice.20 Thoreau concludes that men are required to face complicity with evil
once a year, saying:
I meet this American government . . . once a year . . . in the
person of its tax-gatherer; this is the only mode in which a man
situated as I am necessarily meets it; and it then says distinctly,
Recognize me; and the simplest, the most effectual, and, in the
present posture of affairs, the indispensablest mode of treating
with it on this head, of expressing your little satisfaction with and
love for it, is to deny it then.21
13. See 50 U.S.C. app. § 456(j) (2014) (exempting pacifists from the draft).
14. See, e.g., Statement of Purpose, NAT’L WAR TAX RESISTANCE COORDINATING COMMIT-
TEE, http://www.nwtrcc.org/sop.php (last visited Mar. 9, 2014) (“We oppose militarism and war
and refuse to complicitly participate in the tax system which supports such violence. NWTRCC
sees poverty, racism, sexism, homophobia, economic exploitation, environmental destruction and
militarization of law enforcement as integrally linked with the militarism which we abhor.”).
15. Little Sisters of the Poor Home for the Aged v. Sebelius, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 180867,
*7–*13 (D. Colo. Dec. 27, 2013).
16. HENRY DAVID THOREAU, CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE (1848), reprinted in WALDEN AND CIVIL
DISOBEDIENCE 224, 224 (Owen Thomas ed., 1966).
17. Id. at 225.
18. Id. at 228–29.
19. Id. at 233.
20. See generally id.
21. Id. at 232.
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Thoreau did refuse to pay his taxes and the state imprisoned him for his
beliefs. Modern war tax resisters are similarly steadfast; even jail time does
not dissuade war tax resisters from what they see as the dictates of
conscience.
The refusal to become complicit with sin results in more than tension
between the taxpayer’s conscience and the government; it also results in
lower revenue for the government. This loss of revenue occurs despite the
fact war tax resisters, unlike other tax evaders, “seek no personal gain” from
their nonpayment of tax. In fact, many relinquish control of their tax money
by putting it in a bank account and waiting for the IRS to seize it or donate
it to charitable causes.22 The willingness of war tax resisters to part with
their money suggests the IRS could easily collect this money if the money
was spent in ways that did not violate the conscience of the resisters and
further highlights the challenge war tax resisters present.
Thoreau advised those in his audience unwilling to risk jail to live
simply, saying:
But, if I deny the authority of the State when it presents its tax
bill, it will soon take and waste all my property, and so harass me
and my children without end. This is hard. This makes it impossi-
ble for a man to live honestly, and at the same time comfortably,
in outward respects. It will not be worth the while to accumulate
property; that would be sure to go again. You must hire or squat
somewhere, and raise but a small crop, and eat that soon. You
must live within yourself . . . .23
To avoid complicity with sin, some modern war tax resisters follow
Thoreau’s advice, deciding to live below income levels which would gener-
ate a federal income tax. Many combine this with the public expression of
this decision as deliberate, and an attempt to comply with both the law and
the dictates of conscience.24 If a war tax resister chooses to take credits
such as the Earned Income Tax Credit, a married couple with two children
engaging in this form of income tax resistance could make up to $45,776 to
avoid liability.25 If such a family chooses not to take the credits, avoiding
22. Marjorie E. Kornhauser, For God and Country: Taxing Conscience, WIS. L. REV. 939,
943–44 (1999). Interestingly, donating to a charitable cause may result in reduced tax liability
because charitable donations are generally deductible and may provide a tax benefit.
23. THOREAU, supra note 16, at 235.
24. See, e.g., How to Resist War Taxes, WAR RESISTERS LEAGUE, https://www.warresisters
.org/content/how-resist-war-taxes (last visited Sept. 23, 2014). See, for example, the case of Patri-
cia Washburn, who withheld $4,000 of her tax liability, which, after penalties for late payment,
became a debt of $24,000. Unable to satisfy the debt, the IRS seized Washburn’s car and home.
Following this occurrence, she decided to live below the poverty line to avoid income tax liability.
The IRS uses penalties as a stick to get the taxpayer’s attention; penalties are a necessary collec-
tion tool but are often ineffective when applied to those who resist taxation for religious reasons.
Garrity, supra note 10, at 1243–44.
25. Relationship Between Tax Entry Thresholds and Poverty, 1980-2021, TAX POL’Y CENTER
(Aug. 5, 2011), http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxfacts/displayafact.cfm?Docid=471.
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tax liability would require an income of less than $26,400.26 On its face,
this form of tax resistance may not appear problematic for the government;
if the couple is complying with the applicable tax code, what difference
does it make, practically, if they are doing so out of religious obligation?
The problem is this: these resisters have the capacity to earn more (and thus
to pay more income tax, generating more revenue for the government). The
refusal of the tax code to accommodate their religious beliefs deprives the
government of revenue.
Other resisters know attaching such a statement will likely draw atten-
tion to their returns and do not self-identify as war tax resisters. Take, for
example, T.W.27 T.W. calculates the total amount owed then deducts a per-
centage proportional to the percentage of government funds used for mili-
tary purposes and pays that reduced amount. T.W.’s decision to become a
war tax resister was difficult; he describes himself as a child of government
employees and has enlisted family members.28 His process to war tax resis-
tance began when he read that income taxes used to fund wars were meant
to be temporary.29 He says, “These never-ending conflicts . . . ,” his voice
trailing off. “It rose up in me; I needed to stand outside of this.” Though
T.W. is aware of the government’s ability to prosecute him, the conse-
quences of his decision did not deter him from engaging in resistance. He
and his wife were married in a religious ceremony but are not legally mar-
ried because she is not a war tax resister and he worries his decision may
cause her liability.30 “It breaks my heart to say we aren’t married. No, I
can’t say that. We got married; we have a certificate. If push comes to
shove, I have to be able to show I did this all on my own. I have to protect
her.”31 He has saved enough money to pay his back taxes and penalties
when he is audited but says, “I admire people who are self-identified [as
war tax resisters]. I don’t self-identify. I wouldn’t want to go to jail but I’m
only thinking that way because we’re trying to conceive a child. If it were
just me, I would do prison time.”32
Another tactic some war tax resisters take is to create a fictional de-
duction to effectively reduce one’s taxable income down to zero and en-
close a statement explaining the reason the taxpayer created the deduction,
explaining that failure-to-pay is intentional and is a result of religious be-
26. Id.
27. T.W. agreed to be interviewed but asked I not identify him by name.
28. Interview with T.W., in Phila., Pa. (June 30, 2014).
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. The “certificate” to which T.W. refers is likely a Quaker wedding certificate. Quaker
marriages were frequently not recognized by the state because Quakers eschew officiants, believ-
ing the couple marries themselves. The rest of their meeting (church members) signs the certifi-
cate in recognition of the marriage. Id.
32. Id.
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lief.33 These approaches result in significant additions to one’s tax liability
through application of penalties.34 The IRS has classified these deductions
as “frivolous” and fined war tax resisters up to an additional $5,000 over
and above the other failure-to-pay penalties and interest.35 The National
War Tax Resistance Coordinating Committee reports, however, the IRS has
assessed the fee even against taxpayers who filed a correct income tax re-
turn, paid the total amount owed, and merely enclosed a letter stating they
were paying their income tax under duress.36 A recent formal opinion is-
sued by the IRS states that such a position is incorrect; that the frivolous
filing fee should only be assessed against those who either file an erroneous
tax return (those who claim a war tax deduction, for example) or against
those who state their purpose is to impede federal income tax collection.37
The fee should not be assessed against those who merely explain they are
filing under duress.38
Some resisters refuse to file at all, even if they might be allowed a
refund or a credit. Says T.W., “I haven’t had a refund since I started doing
this. Even if we have kids and we would qualify for the Earned Income Tax
Credit, I wouldn’t cash their checks. I don’t want any part of that money.”39
But others feel differently. Says Bob Runyan,
We do everything normally on our taxes except we refuse to pay
the [proportion of tax equivalent to military spending]. We have
collected the Earned Income Credit in the past. We have also had
the [refund] that we would have received due to the Earned In-
come Credit taken by the IRS. I don’t see a connection between
the Earned Income Credit, which I believe is meant as an anti-
poverty measure, and whether or not one pays war taxes. Again,
if there were a way to pay federal taxes without the money going
to war, then we would gladly comply.40
33. See How to Refuse to Pay for War, NAT’L WAR TAX RESISTANCE COORDINATING COM-
MITTEE, http://www.nwtrcc.org/how_to_resist.php (last visited Sept. 23, 2014).
34. See I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 20133303F (Aug. 16, 2013), available at http://www.irs
.gov/pub/irs-lafa/20133303f.pdf.
35. See 26 U.S.C. § 6702 (2014). Section 6702(a) imposes a $5,000 penalty on a person
when: 1) the taxpayer files what purports to be a tax return that (A) does not contain information
as to whether the tax assessment is correct or which (B) contains information that on its face
indicates the return is incorrect; and 2) the information or lack of information the taxpayer in-
cludes on or with the return is based (A) on a position which the IRS has identified as frivolous or
(B) a position that reflects a desire to delay or impede the administration of Federal tax laws. Id.
36. See What To Do If You Receive a “Frivolous” Letter from the IRS, NAT’L WAR TAX
RESISTANCE COORDINATING COMMITTEE, http://www.nwtrcc.org/frivolous.php (last visited Sept.
23, 2014).
37. See I.R.S., supra note 34.
38. See id.
39. Interview with T.W., supra note 28.
40. Runyan, supra note 8.
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War tax resisters may be subject to criminal liability under 26 U.S.C.
§ 7203,41 but the IRS only rarely pursues criminal charges against war tax
resisters.42 This is probably because, first, when it comes to income tax
evaders, war tax resisters are not unsympathetic characters,43 and second, it
is difficult for the IRS to demonstrate the mental state requirement of “will-
fully” failing to file.44 In Cheek, the United States Supreme Court held the
“willful” requirement meant a good-faith belief that one did not have to file
did not violate Section 7203, even if that belief was irrational or unreasona-
ble.45 Thus, the IRS must establish war tax resisters are knowingly and
intentionally breaking the law, which may be too high a bar, given that
many war tax resisters have an arguably good faith belief they are protected
by the First Amendment, even if that belief is irrational or unreasonable.46
Peter Goldberger47 testified in 1992 that the “Justice Department has gener-
41. 26 U.S.C. § 7203 (2014) (providing for civil and criminal penalties for those who “will-
fully” fail to file income tax returns or pay income taxes).
42. See, e.g., Miscellaneous Tax Bills and the Peace Tax Fund: Hearing on H.R. 65, 1733,
and 1870 Before the H. Committee on Ways and Means, 102d Cong. 191 (1992) (statement of
Peter Goldberger, Attorney-Adviser, National Campaign for a Peace Tax Fund).
43. See, for example, a discussion of Priscilla Adams, a Quaker in Philadelphia, who had
never voluntarily paid tax. Though the IRS pursued civil penalties against Adams, it did not seek
criminal penalties. “Michael Livingston, a tax law professor at Rutgers University’s Camden cam-
pus, said image might have something to do with Adams’ ability to escape criminal prosecution
by the IRS. ‘The question of how to respond to these things is a very tricky one for the IRS,’ he
said. ‘It certainly doesn’t look very good for the IRS to go after these people [Quakers].’” The
IRS denied it treated Adams any differently than it would have treated any other taxpayer. Lauren
Mayk, Citing Beliefs, A Quaker Takes On IRS Priscilla Adams of Willingboro Refuses To Pay
Federal Income Tax Because She Doesn’t Want Her Money Helping The Military, PHILLY.COM
(Feb. 28, 2000), http://articles.philly.com/2000-02-28/news/25576687_1_tax-money-religious-so
ciety-federal-agency.
44. T.W. may be an example of a willful failure to file, in that he acknowledges he owes the
income tax, recognizes the court does not recognize a faith-based exception to tax, has not self-
identified, and resists by adjusting his deductions to give him a tax liability of the amount propor-
tionate to non-military spending. It is a difficult balance for resisters. T.W.’s tactic makes it less
likely he will be caught—as the IRS would need to audit him to determine he is resisting, unlike
self-identifiers who alert the IRS to their resistance—but may increase his penalties (as he is
perhaps “willful” in his failure to file, rather than merely “negligent”). But this tactic also allows
him to continue his resistance; if he is not caught, the IRS cannot force him to violate his con-
science by seizing his funds.
45. Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 203 (1991).
46. See, e.g., Mayk, supra note 43. Ted Marasciulo, a tax attorney who has represented other
war tax resisters, said about Adams:
To prosecute Adams criminally, the IRS would have to prove that she had a ‘guilty
mind’ and was intentionally and knowingly breaking the law. . . . ‘A good-faith belief
can keep [the defendant] from being prosecuted’. . . . The ability to prove this criminal
intent, public relations concerns, and the financial cost of a criminal trial may discour-
age the IRS from bringing criminal charges against Adams . . . .
Id. It is likely his comments would accurately describe any prosecution of similarly situated war
tax resisters.
47. Mr. Goldberger is an appellate tax and criminal law attorney based in Philadelphia. He
has represented a number of war tax resisters and was testifying in his capacity as an expert in this
area.
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ally shown [a] commendable restraint and sound discretion in not bringing
criminal prosecutions [against war resisters].”48
It is important to distinguish the war tax resister from an ordinary tax
evader motived by greed. War tax resisters do not hide their income or
assets from the government and the vast majority file income tax returns;
they simply refuse to pay for what they see as sinful.49 They are different
from people who protest tax for non-religious reasons. Unlike those who
believe the government has no power to tax, war tax resisters believe the
state can and should tax its citizens.50 And unlike those who object to the
payment of taxes because they believe the government ought not to tax
(anarchists, for example), war tax resisters do not find the collection of tax
to be a wrongful use of government resources.51 Their objection is simply
this: they believe war, in all its forms and for all reasons, is sinful.52 They
resist, to the utmost, any attempt to force them to participate in war. And
they see war tax resistance as the only way to avoid complicity in the sin of
war.53 Congress and the courts, however, treat war tax resisters and those
who resist taxes for other reasons, as well as garden-variety tax evaders, as
the same—all three are subjected to the same fines and penalties.54
II. HISTORY OF CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION
Preserving religious freedom by permitting pacifists to avoid military
service has been a time-honored priority of the United States. In the colony
of Pennsylvania, although pacifists were not exempt from conscription, the
state legislature allowed pacifists to hire a substitute in the case of conscrip-
48. Misc. Tax Bills and the Peace Tax Fund: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Select Reve-
nue Measures of the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 102d Cong. 191 (1992) (statement of Peter
Goldberger, Attorney).
49. The War Tax Resisters League website includes a letter entitled “An Appeal to Con-
science” with this quote:
Refusal to pay taxes used to finance unjust wars, along with refusal by soldiers to fight
in them, is a direct and potentially effective form of citizen noncooperation, and one that
governments cannot ignore. War tax refusal has a long and honorable tradition among
religious and secular opponents of war. Refusal to pay all or a portion of one’s federal
taxes as a form of conscientious objection to war may involve personal risks.
An Appeal to Conscience, WAR RESISTERS LEAGUE, https://www.warresisters.org/node/326 (last
visited Sept. 23, 2014). And the National War Tax Resistance Coordinating Committee puts it
succinctly: “War tax resisters are not out to enrich themselves by evading taxes.” What is War Tax
Resistance?, NAT’L WAR TAX RESISTANCE COORDINATING COMMITTEE, http://www.nwtrcc.org/
what_is_wtr.php (last visited Sept. 23, 2014).
50. Telephone Interview with Alonzo Valentine, Professor of Peace and Justice Studies at
Earlham School of Religion (Sept. 22, 2013).
51. Id.
52. Runyan, supra note 8.
53. “For most of us who resist, the dire consequences of voluntarily paying for war are far
worse [than] what the IRS and government can do to us.”  NAT’L WAR TAX RESISTANCE COORDI-
NATING COMMITTEE, supra note 49.
54. See, for example, 26 U.S.C. § 6702 (2006) which provides for a $5,000 “frivolous” filing
penalty. This penalty is applied to those who take facially invalid deductions for any reason—
whether that reason is religiously motivated or not. Id.
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tion.55 In 1755, John Woolman addressed the Philadelphia Yearly Meet-
ing,56 urging Quakers57 to refuse to pay taxes for war.58 Woolman and other
similar-minded Quakers later sent a letter to other Quaker groups, saying,
“[W]e . . . think that as we cannot be concerned in wars and fightings, so
neither ought we to contribute thereto by paying the tax directed by the said
Act, though suffering be the consequence of our refusal, which we hope to
be enabled to bear with patience.”59
The Continental Congress of 1775 adopted a resolution exempting re-
ligiously motivated conscientious objectors from service in state militias.60
In lieu of military service, the resolution encouraged pacifists to “‘contrib-
ute liberally in this time of national calamity’ and to offer whatever services
they were able to perform, consistent with their religious principles,”61 an
early form of “alternative service.” This resolution demonstrates that, from
the earliest days of the nation, the refusal to conscript pacifists while still
permitting them to contribute to the life of the nation was important. Simi-
larly, providing a taxation alternative could provide pacifists an opportunity
to perform alternate service.
And Congress discussed conscientious objectors and those whose re-
ligious beliefs required opposition to paying for war at the drafting of the
United States Constitution. Mr. Jackson proposed a conscientious objector
exemption to military service, offering this addition to the current Second
Amendment, “no person religiously scrupulous of bearing arms shall be
compelled to render military service in person.”62 It was suggested this
right should be conditioned upon “paying an equivalent,”63 but Mr. Roger
Sherman of Connecticut said, “It is well known that those who are relig-
iously scrupulous of bearing arms are equally scrupulous of getting substi-
tutes or paying an equivalent. Many of them would rather die than do either
one or the other.”64 To war resisters, paying tax which Congress uses to
fund the military is the functional equivalent of hiring a substitute to kill for
55. See PETER BROCK, PACIFISM IN THE UNITED STATES: FROM THE COLONIAL ERA TO THE
FIRST WORLD WAR 21, 22 (1968).
56. A Yearly Meeting is an annual gathering of Quakers where issues of doctrine, faith, and
practice are decided by consensus.
57. The proper term for Quakers is “Friend” as the Quaker church is properly termed “The
Religious Society of Friends of the Truth.” However, while Quaker was initially a pejorative term,
many Friends have embraced the name and use it, especially with non-Quakers as “Quaker” is
more widely known than “Friend.” Thus, I use Quaker throughout this paper.
58. Letter from Abraham Farrington et al. (Dec. 16, 1755), in We Won’t Pay: A Tax Resis-
tance Reader 23, 24 (David Gross ed. 2008).
59. Id.
60. William D. Palmer, Time to Exorcise Another Ghost from the Vietnam War: Restructur-
ing the In-Service Conscientious Objector Program, 140 MIL. L. REV. 179, 182 (1993).
61. Id.
62. 1 Annals of Cong. 434 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834).
63. Meaning paying a substitute to serve in one’s place.
64. 1 Annals of Cong. 779 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834).
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them65—the very thing Mr. Sherman noted the religiously scrupulous
would rather die than do.
During the Civil War, the Union passed the Conscription Act of March
3, 1863.66 The Act permitted a draftee to find a substitute to fight for him or
pay the government $300 to hire a substitute.67 Many pacifists refused to
participate or to hire a substitute.68 The government subjected those whom
it conscripted and who then refused to hire a substitute (or who were unable
to do so) to punishment—including death.69 Cyrus Pringle, who chose to go
to prison rather than comply with conscription, explained, “We cannot
purchase life at the cost of peace of soul.”70 Perhaps recognizing that the
Conscription Act was unworkable, Congress amended it one year later to
provide conscientious objectors with alternative service: objectors could ei-
ther serve in the hospitals or care for freedmen or pay another to do so (in
contrast to paying for another to serve as a soldier).71 Establishing consci-
entious objector status required the claimant to prove “by satisfactory evi-
dence that his deportment has been uniformly consistent with [a claim of
conscientious objection].”72
In World War I, the military began granting conscientious objector
status. Modern conscientious objector status means permitting a conscripted
conscientious objector to perform alternate service in lieu of military ser-
vice—echoing the resolution of the Continental Congress.73 After being
conscripted, conscientious objectors during World War I formally claimed
conscientious objector status.74 Congress required the men to establish the
veracity of their conscientious objection claims to psychologists and other
65. Runyan, supra note 8.
66. While the Confederacy also had programs to exempt conscientious objectors, these pro-
grams became more limited as wartime losses for the Confederacy accumulated and the need for
Confederate soldiers became greater. LILLIAN SCHLISSEL, CONSCIENCE IN AMERICA 90 (Lillian
Schlissel ed., 1968). It is possible the Union remained comparatively sympathetic to the plight of
conscientious objectors because many of the anti-slavery Republicans supporting President Lin-
coln were also pacifists. See John Whiteclay Chambers II, Conscientious Objectors and the Amer-
ican State from Colonial Times to the Present, in The New Conscientious Objection: From Sacred
to Secular Resistance 45 (Charles C. Moskos & John Whiteclay Chambers II eds., 1993).
67. Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 75, § 13, 12 Stat. 731, 733 (1863).
68. See BROCK, supra note 55, at 22.
69. Superior officers often threatened conscientious objectors with severe punishments, in-
cluding imprisonment and death. See Cyrus Pringle, Diary, in CONSCIENCE IN AMERICA 102, 107
(Lillian Schlissel ed., 1968).
70. Id. at 105.
71. See Act of Feb. 24, 1864, ch.13, § 17, 13 Stat. 6, 9 (1864).
72. Id.
73. Chambers II, supra note 66, at 33–35.
74. Section 4 of the Selective Service Act of 1917 restricted conscientious objector status to
members of “any well-recognized religious sect or organization at present organized and existing
and whose existing creed or principles forbid its members to participate in war in any form . . . .”
Pub. L. No. 65-12, 40 Stat. 76, 78 (1917). In other words, conscientious objectors had to show
membership in a historic peace church—traditionally including the Anabaptists, Quakers, and
Brethren.
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officials (including army officers). It is estimated some 4,000 men claimed
conscientious objector status and 95 percent of the men claiming conscien-
tious objector status did so because of sincerely held beliefs—meaning they
were not malingerers or shirkers but were religiously motivated conscien-
tious objectors to war.75
Most of the men remained under the control of the military in non-
combatant positions.76 (Non-combatant positions are positions of service to
the military that do not require objectors to carry weapons. For example, a
non-combatant might serve as a medic or as a radio operator but would
wear a military uniform.) The military found 1,300 men qualified to do
non-combatant service within the military.77 Another 1,200 received “farm-
furloughs,” being sent to do farm work in the place of men at war.78 Ninety-
nine went to Europe to assist in rebuilding under the guidance of the Ameri-
can Friends Service Committee (a Quaker service organization). Nine-hun-
dred and forty men remained in Army camps.79 This willingness to give
objectors another way to fulfill their duties to the republic—an alternative
service that did not violate their religious beliefs—demonstrates Congress’
continued commitment to providing alternate service.
However, just as there are levels of war tax resistance—ranging from
the legal (reducing income to levels below the income tax thresholds) to the
dubious (filing tax returns with a statement the paying of tax is done under
protest) to the illegal (refusing to pay)—there are levels of conscientious
objection.80
Some 400 men absolutely refused participation, rejecting any form of
non-combatant service, resulting in their imprisonment.81 Imprisonment
was typically at an army camp.82 One conscientious objector wrote of his
experience at such an army camp in this way:
75. Chambers II, supra note 66, at 34.
76. Id. at 33.
77. Id. at 34.
78. See Anne M. Yoder, World War I Conscientious Objectors (May 2002), http://www
.swarthmore.edu/library/peace/conscientiousobjection/WWI.COs.coverpage.htm.
79. Id.
80. Kornhauser lists the following as “negative” methods of war tax resistance:
1) supporting war tax resistance of others by contributing to a tax resisters’ penalty
fund; 2) refusing to pay federal phone taxes; 3) paying federal income taxes but writing
“paid under protest” on the form; 4) paying the tax due but with a check made out to the
Department of Health and Human Services; 5) filing an income tax return correctly but
refusing to pay a symbolic amount of the tax and sending an attached letter explaining;
6) filing income tax return correctly but paying only the nonmilitary portion of the
taxes; 7) sending any unpaid tax to a community justice or peace organization; and
8) not filing and/or not paying any income tax.
Kornhauser, supra note 22, at 957–58.
81. History of the Campaign for a Peace Tax Fund, NAT’L CAMPAIGN FOR A PEACE TAX
FUND, http://www.peacetaxfund.org/aboutus/history.htm (last revised July 25, 2013).
82. See MELVIN GINGERICH, SERVICE FOR PEACE: A HISTORY OF MENNONITE CIVILIAN PUB-
LIC SERVICE, 10 (Mennonite Central Committee, 1949).
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We were cursed, beaten, kicked, and compelled to go through ex-
ercises to the extent that a few were unconscious for some min-
utes. They kept it up for the greater part of the afternoon, and then
those who could possibly stand on their feet were compelled to
take cold shower baths. One of the boys was scrubbed with a
scrubbing brush using lye on him. They drew blood in several
places.83
Religious scruples create a zealous refusal to comply with laws violat-
ing those principles. This noncompliance may seem nonsensical (or at least
irrational) to those not similarly motivated. A poignant description of that
seemingly nonsensical resistance to any participation in war is that of four
Hutterite (Christian pacifist) men who absolutely refused service of any
kind; they refused to even wear uniforms.84 They would not apply for con-
scientious objector status because to do so required they fill out a document
called “Statement of Soldier.”85 The Hutterites could not claim to be
soldiers to object to being soldiers without becoming complicit with sin.86
They were held in solitary confinement, beaten, and starved. Two of these
men, Joseph and Michael Hofer, died at Fort Leavenworth.87 The military
returned their bodies to their pacifist families in the military uniforms they
refused to wear while alive.88
Little Sisters of the Poor Home for the Aged make similar claims re-
garding filling out forms. To obtain the ACA exemption, religious nonprof-
its must complete a two page form which certifies the organization as a
nonprofit with a sincerely held objection and directs a third party to provide
the objected-to medical care.89 The Little Sisters plaintiffs claim merely
filling out the forms violates their religious beliefs because the form re-
quires them to direct another party to commit a sinful act, thus making them
complicit in the sinful act.90 On its face, this objection seems to mirror the
Hutterites’ claims that filling out the request for accommodation would vio-
late their beliefs. But the Hutterites refused to sign because the language at
83. Id., (quoting JONAS SMUCKER HARTZLER, MENNONITES IN THE WAR, OR NONRESISTANCE
UNDER TEST (Mennonite Publishing Committee 1922)). It is not clear why the military engaged in
these harsh methods. The motivation might have been to encourage conscientious objectors to
renounce their pacifism or to punish them for noncompliance.
84. Duane C.S. Stoltzfus, Standing in Chains at Alcatraz: When Hutterites Were Called to






89. EBSA FORM 700 (2014), available at http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/
uploads/2014/01/EBSA-Form-700.pdf.
90. See Brief for Petitioner at 10-11, Little Sisters of the Poor Home for the Aged v. Sebe-
lius, 134 S.Ct. 1022 (No. 13A691), available at http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/
uploads/2014/01/13A691-application1.pdf.
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the top of the form identified them as soldiers; this identification was what
they saw as the sin.91
In contrast, Little Sisters argues completing the ACA exemption form
would violate their beliefs because the second part of the form would direct
another to do what they, because of their religious beliefs, cannot do. (The
first part of the form, certifying themselves as a qualifying religious non-
profit, does not seem to be a source of contention.) The Little Sisters bear
more similarity to war tax resisters, who refuse to file tax returns because to
do so would pay another to fight for them, something which, because of
their religious beliefs, they cannot do.
The Little Sisters conflates these acts in their brief, saying,
Indeed, the crux of the Tenth Circuit’s decision was that Appli-
cants could avoid all penalties . . . if they would simply fill out the
forms the government mandates. Such reasoning would, of
course, resolve all religious liberty cases: Quaker conscientious
objectors would suffer no penalties if they would just join the
military . . . .92
But Quaker conscientious objectors do fill out forms to avoid military ser-
vice. It is not the certification process to which most objectors object. It is
the requirement to comply with the act that is objectionable. And what con-
scientious objectors to tax will not do is pay another to do what they will
not, which is the relief both groups seek.
War tax resisters, as fellow pacifists, share this refusal to participate in
war, despite great pressure to comply. While the IRS is not compelling war
tax resisters to take cold showers and is not drawing their blood, many war
tax resisters remain firm in their refusal to comply in the face of both civil
and criminal penalties.93
The Selective Training and Service Act of 1940 provided a man could
qualify for conscientious objector status if he could establish a long-stand-
ing religious belief in the immorality of killing another human being.94 The
objection could not be for moral or political reasons, but had to be based on
religious belief. Selective objection did not establish conscientious objec-
tion within the meaning of the Selective Training and Service Act; thus, the
conscientious objector who allowed there might be such a thing as a “just
war” could not qualify.95 Thirty-four million men registered for the draft,
91. It is also possible language barriers caused the refusal. See Stoltzfus, supra note 84.
92. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 90, at 26.
93. The IRS’ motivation is clear: Taxpayers can believe what they like, but must pay their
taxes. And the IRS aims to apply pressure until compliance is achieved.
94. Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-783, § 5(g), 54 Stat. 885, 889
(1940) available at http://www.legisworks.org/congress/76/publaw-783.pdf.
95. Id.
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72,354 of these applied for conscientious objector status.96 Of these, ap-
proximately 25,000 accepted non-combatant positions within the military.97
Approximately 27,000 of the conscientious objectors were deemed ineligi-
ble for the draft due to their physical condition.98 Another 12,000 men, who
refused to serve in the military, even in a non-weapons carrying (non-com-
batant) capacity, entered into Civilian Public Service.99
Congress created Civilian Public Service as a form of alternative ser-
vice, building on the work of the Civilian Conservation Corps Congress had
created during the Great Depression.100 The men lived in camps and did
work that served the greater community—building bridges, preserving na-
tional parks, monitoring soil, and so on.101
During the Korean War, the Selective Service System further formal-
ized the application process for conscientious objectors seeking to perform
alternative service by creating the I-W application for conscientious objec-
tors and allowing institutions to apply to receive I-W qualified workers.
Between 1952 and 1955, over 10,000 men applied for, and received, I-W
status.102 Selective Service approved over 1,200 such institutions.103
The Vietnam era ushered in a very unpopular military conflict and the
number of conscientious objectors rose. Almost a half million men applied
for conscientious objector status.104 Among them, in 1965, was Daniel See-
ger (and his co-appellants).105 While not a member of a historic peace
96. Anne M. Yoder, Brief History of Conscientious Objection, http://www.swarthmore.edu/




99. Id. Over 6,000 men simply refused to comply with the Selective Service requirements in
any way. Id.They were sentenced to prison; failure to register for the draft remains a federal crime.
Id. At present, there is no way to register for the draft as a conscientious objector, so some young
men refuse to register out of concern they will be drafted. In addition to risking jail time, these
young men are ineligible for federal financial aid for college as well as other federal benefits. See,
e.g., Selective Service System, Fast Facts, Benefits and Programs Linked to Registration, http://
www.sss.gov/FSbenefits.htm (last visited Sept. 7, 2013). Interestingly, during World War II, many
conscientious objectors performing alternate service served unpaid, unlike soldiers who were paid.
The peace churches supported their members and their members’ families. Now, if a young man
fails to register for the Selective Service and becomes ineligible for federal financial aid, the
historic peace churches provide scholarships. See, e.g., Center on Conscience & War, The Fund
for Education and Training, http://centeronconscience.org/event-schedule/fund-for-education-
and-training.html (last visited Sept. 7, 2013). Similarly, many war tax resisters contribute to a
communal fund designed to be used if the IRS compels a resister to pay tax. This solidarity (and
stubbornness in the face of sometimes severe consequences) is part of what makes collecting from
war tax resisters so difficult.
100. See generally 16 U.S.C. ch. 3A, §§ 584–90 (repealed 1966).
101. See generally id.
102. See Yoder, supra note 96.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 167 (1965).
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church,106 and indeed, not necessarily religious, Seeger objected to war,
claiming conscientious objector status.107 The Supreme Court held the mili-
tary must allow men whose belief system did not encompass a Supreme
Being, but which forbade participation in war, conscientious objector sta-
tus.108 The Court based its holding on the Establishment Clause, holding
conscientious objection could not be limited to members of historic peace
churches (a previous military standard to establish conscientious objection)
or even to those motivated by a particular faith. The Court did not hold that
the Free Exercise Clause required a conscientious objector status but did
hold that once Congress created such a status, it had to be granted without
favoritism.
In 1967, Congress adopted today’s definition of a conscientious objec-
tor, which could be analogized to war tax resisters. The Military Selective
Service Act provides “any person . . . who, by reason of religious training
and belief, is conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any
form.”109 Then, in 1971, the Supreme Court expanded conscientious objec-
tor status to include anyone with a “deeply felt” belief in the moral and
ethical impermissibility of every war.110 Gillette held that requiring consci-
entious objectors to be opposed to all war was not a violation of the Estab-
lishment Clause. Thus, while a particular religious faith could not be
required, objection to war must be required. The Court further held that
allowing conscientious objectors to perform alternate service had two secu-
lar purposes.111 Conscientious objectors make poor soldiers (just as war tax
resisters make poor taxpayers) and attempting to turn objectors into soldiers
is a waste of resources,112 (just as attempting to make war tax resisters pay
taxes is a waste of resources). The Court specifically addressed the notion
of the drafted conscientious objector and the difficulty he would face when
forced to choose between obedience to the law and obedience to his God,
saying, “in the forum of conscience, duty to a moral power higher than the
State has always been maintained.”113 This is the same quandary war tax
resisters face.
106. A historic peace church is one whose creed requires a pacifistic stance.
107. Seeger, 380 U.S. at 167–68.
108. Id. at 175–76.
109. The Military Selective Service Act of 1967, 50 U.S.C.A. § 456(j) (West, Westlaw
through P.L. 113-145 (excluding P.L. 113-121, 113-128, and 113-143)).
110. Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 454 (1971) (explaining that “The relevant indi-
vidual belief is simply objection to all war, not adherence to any extraneous theological
viewpoint.”).
111. Id. at 452–53.
112. Id.
113. Id. (quoting United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 633 (1931) (Hughes, C.J.,
dissenting)).
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The end of the draft in 1973 largely ended the large-scale application
for conscientious objector status;114 few are the pacifist soldiers in a volun-
teer army. Nevertheless, there are soldiers who occasionally recognize their
objection to war after enlisting, so there continues to be some limited use of
the conscientious objector status by enlisted soldiers who claim to have
become conscientious objectors.115 Similar methods could be adopted to
determine whether a taxpayer ought to qualify for alternate taxation.
Establishing the sincerity of one’s objection to war is a thorough pro-
cess that weeds out false applicants. While the directive does not permit the
evaluating officer to consider the veracity of the applicant’s religious be-
liefs (the officer cannot engage the applicant in a back-and-forth debate
about whether his or her beliefs are objectively “correct”), the directive
does require the applicant prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that the
objector’s beliefs are honest, sincere, and deeply held.116
The first step to applying for conscientious status within the military is
to submit an application based off the I-W form.117 This written application
must explain how the conscientious objector’s belief in pacifism came to
be.118 The application must also demonstrate the conscientious objector
does not seek to avoid military service.119 After all, a sudden conversion to
pacifism upon being drafted suggests an aversion to military service rather
than a commitment to pacifism.120
Questions traditionally included on the I-W form (or the more modern
SSS 150) have been:
1. Describe the nature of your belief.
2. How, when and from what source have you received training
or acquired this belief?
3. Who is the individual you rely on most for religious guidance?
114. Yoder, supra note 78 (“Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird announced on January 27,
1973 that the draft was to end, as of that date, in favor of voluntary enlistment.”).
115. See, for example, the case of Kimberly Rivera, US Soldier Who Refused to Go Back to
Iraq Arrested on Return from Canada, NBC NEWS, Sept. 21, 2012, http://worldnews.nbcnews
.com/_news/2012/09/21/14008027-us-soldier-who-refused-to-go-back-to-iraq-arrested-on-return-
from-canada?lite, and the case of Mark Wilkerson, John W. Gonzalez, Soldier Who Deserted
Before Iraq Gets 7 Months, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, Feb. 23, 2007, http://www.chron.com/news/
houston-texas/article/Soldier-who-deserted-before-Iraq-gets-7-months-1796959.php.
116. U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., INSTRUCTION 1300.06, CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS ¶ 5.3 (May 31,
2007), available at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/130006p.pdf [hereinafter DoDI
1300.06].
117. Id. ¶¶ 7.1, E2.
118. Id. ¶ E2.2.2.
119. Id. ¶ 5.2.2.
120. As the Selective Service puts it, “[T]he man’s lifestyle prior to making his claim must
reflect his current claims.” Conscientious Objection and Alternative Service, SELECTIVE SERV.
SYS., www.sss.gov/FSconsobj.htm (last modified Apr. 30, 2002). See also Basic Draft and Regis-
tration Information, CTR. ON CONSCIENCE & WAR 1 (last modified Sept. 2005), http://centeroncon
science.org/images/stories/pdf/basic.pdf (directing young men to compile documentation of their
conscientious objector status prior to turning eighteen).
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4. When, if ever, do you believe in the use of force?
5. Describe any of your actions or behavior that show the depth
and consistency of your belief.
6. Describe any public expression of your belief.
7. Have you ever been a member of the military?
8. Are you a member of any religious sect?
9. Describe the creed of that sect as it relates to war.
10. Describe your relationships or activities with non-military
and non-religious organizations.121
Persons who come to conscientious objection after enlisting may apply for
conscientious objector status using the procedures outlined in the Depart-
ment of Defense Instruction 1300.06 as applied by the various branches.
Each branch has developed questionnaires similar to the SSS 150 form. For
example, the Air Force asks the applicant to supply information about how
and when the applicant came to be a conscientious objector, when, if ever,
the use of force might be appropriate, and so on.122
The only way to evaluate an applicant’s internal beliefs is by evaluat-
ing the behaviors that are the external manifestation of those beliefs.123 Fac-
tors the evaluating officer may consider when determining a conscientious
objector’s sincerity include:
training in the home and religious organization; general demeanor
and pattern of conduct [of the applicant]; participation in religious
activities; whether ethical or moral convictions were gained
through training, study, contemplation, or other activity compara-
ble in rigor and dedication to the processes by which traditional
religious convictions are formulated; credibility of the applicant;
and credibility of persons supporting the claim.124
In the written application, the conscientious objector is asked to de-
scribe how he came to his pacifistic beliefs.125 Although membership in a
historic peace church is not sufficient by itself to establish one’s own belief
in pacifism, the objector may present such membership to support a claim
of pacifism.126 Pacifists may demonstrate their long-standing objection to
war by establishing active participation (in addition to mere membership) in
a historic peace church and other activities that demonstrate a long-standing
commitment to peace, such as attendance at marches and protests against
121. See, e.g., Clark v. United States, 236 F.2d 13, 15 n.3 (9th Cir. 1956).
122. See U.S. AIR FORCE, INSTRUCTION 36-3204: PROCEDURES FOR APPLYING AS A CONSCIEN-
TIOUS OBJECTOR ¶ A2.2 (July 15, 1994), available at http://static.e-publishing.af.mil/production/1/
af_a1/publication/afi36-3204/afi36-3204.pdf. See also U.S. COAST GUARD, COMMANDANT IN-
STRUCTION 1900.8: CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS AND THE REQUIREMENT TO BEAR ARMS ¶ 7(a)(2)
(Nov. 30, 1990), available at http://www.uscg.mil/directives/ci/1000-1999/CI_1900_8.pdf.
123. DoDI 1300.06, supra note 116 ¶ 5.2.2.1.
124. Id. ¶ 5.2.2.2.
125. Id. ¶ E2.2.
126. Id. ¶ 5.2.3.2.
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war.127 Peace churches advise conscientious objectors to keep a record of
those activities in which they have participated and which show a genuine,
deeply held belief in pacifism.128 The conscientious objector might also file
letters of reference from acquaintances, members of the clergy, family, and
friends who can attest to the long-standing nature of the religious belief.129
Conscientious objectors may also explain how they became conscientious
objectors—was that process one of training, of contemplation, or both?130
To test the “credibility” of the belief, the military currently requires an
interview with a military chaplain and a psychiatrist.131 The chaplain evalu-
ates the nature of the applicant’s religious beliefs based on the applicant’s
religious training whereas the psychiatrist ensures there are no mental
health issues that might preclude military service.132
Considering the vigorous processes historically and currently in place
to prove conscientious objector status—as well as the few findings of ma-
lingering or false claims—it becomes apparent conscientious objector status
is neither easily sought nor easily obtained, but is available for those who
can establish a deeply held, genuine, and sincere belief that war is sinful.
This same vigorous process could be easily adopted and used to prevent
false claims of conscientious objection in the field of taxation.
III. HISTORY OF WAR TAX RESISTANCE
War tax resistance has likely existed as long as war has existed. Trac-
ing the history of war tax resistance gives insight into why a revised Relig-
ious Freedom Tax Bill might resolve the problem of trying to collect tax
money from persons who believe submitting to collection is equivalent to
complicity with sin. Certainly, war tax resistance is older than the United
States itself. In the late 1600s Quakers in the Pennsylvania Assembly re-
fused to pay two tax assessments—one in support of the Anglo-Dutch war
127. See id. ¶ 5.2.3.4
(Where an applicant is or has been a member of a religious organization or tradition, and
where the applicant’s claim of conscientious objection is related to such membership,
inquiry may properly be made as to the fact of membership, and the teaching of the
religious organization or tradition, as well as the applicant’s religious activity.).
128. See this advice from the Ithaca Monthly Meeting (Quaker community) to its members:
In anticipation of a draft, you should prepare a file of evidence of your beliefs. At
minimum, include in this file photocopies of your registration card and other attempts to
get on record, a comprehensive statement of your beliefs, documentation of activities in
your life that help to support your claim, and letters of support. This evidence can be
provided to the local board who will hear your claim for CO classification if you are
drafted.
Conscientious Objection Information, ITHACA MONTHLY MEETING, http://ithacamonthlymeeting
.org/resources/conscientious-objection-information/ (last visited Sept. 25, 2014); see also CTR. ON
CONSCIENCE & WAR, supra note 120.
129. SELECTIVE SERV. SYS., supra note 120 (“He may provide written documentation or in-
clude personal appearances by people he knows who can attest to his claims.”).
130. DoDI 1300.06, supra note 116 ¶ 5.2.2.2.
131. Id. ¶ 7.3.
132. Id.
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and another in support of King William’s War.133 When the Quaker assem-
bly refused to pay a tax of 4,000 pounds for an expedition to Canada, the
assembly explained “it was contrary to their religious principles to hire men
to kill one another.”134 And, of course, there was the refusal of pacifists to
pay for substitutes during the Revolutionary and Civil Wars, which many
war tax resisters analogize to paying tax used for military spending.135
However, it was not until World War II that the income tax evolved
into a mass tax136 and large numbers of people found themselves paying for
war—among them, pacifists.137 During World War I, the top income tax
rates increased from 7% to 77%.138 The percentage of those paying income
taxes increased from roughly 2% to nearly 17%, and the income tax reve-
nue went from less than 10% of total federal revenues in 1914 to nearly
83% by the end of the war.139 After World War I, income tax revenue
dropped dramatically.140 But in 1942, Congress re-introduced the employee
withholding tax, in part to fund World War II.141 This reintroduction trans-
formed the income tax from a “class-based income tax to mass-based in-
come tax system,”142 meaning pacifists not previously required to consider
whether payment of tax would violate their religious beliefs now faced this
conundrum. Some became war tax resisters.
War tax resisters proved as stubborn as their conscientious-objector-to-
military-service counterparts. In 1942, the first known war tax resister of
the modern era, Ernest Bromley, emerged. Bromley refused to pay for the
133. See History of War Tax Resistance: 400 B.C. to 1699 A.D., NAT’L WAR TAX RESISTANCE
COORDINATING COMMITTEE, http://www.nwtrcc.org/history/history1.php (last visited Sept. 25,
2014). See also History of War Tax Resistance, WAR RESISTERS LEAGUE, https://www.warresis
ters.org/node/328 (last visited Sept. 25, 2014).
134. See DONALD D. KAUFMAN, THE TAX DILEMMA: PRAYING FOR PEACE, PAYING FOR WAR
30 (1978).
135. Runyan, supra note 8. “I won’t go to war and I don’t want to pay for someone else to kill
for me.” Id.
136. See Ajay K. Mehrotra, Lawyers, Guns & Public Monies: The U.S. Treasury, World War
One, and the Administration of the Modern Fiscal State, 28 LAW & HIST. REV. 173, 173–74
(2010) (“[I]t was during the war that the federal government ended its traditional reliance on
regressive import duties and excise taxes as principal sources of revenue and began a modern era
of fiscal governance, one based primarily on the direct and progressive taxation of personal and
corporate income.”).
137. Many of the citations in the following section come from the National War Tax Resis-
tance Coordinating Committee or the War Resisters League, arguably biased sources; however,
there does not appear to be an opposing source’s recitation of the history of war tax resistance.
History of War Tax Resistance, supra note 133.
138. Mehrotra, Lawyers, Guns & Public Monies, supra note 136, at 182 tbl.1.
139. Id. at 180–82, tbl. 1.
140. Ajay K. Mehrotra, The Price of Conflict: War, Taxes, and The Politics of Fiscal Citizen-
ship, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1053, 1064 (2009).
141. Id. at 1069 (“The Revenue Act of 1942, in fact, marked the start of a new era of fiscal
policy, as the dramatic increase in rates, the decrease in exemption levels, and the reintroduction
of tax withholding, transformed the early class-based income tax into a mass-based income tax
system.”).
142. Id.
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“defense tax stamp” levied against all cars and used to fund World War
II.143 Withholding the $7.09 “defense tax stamp” liability resulted in
Bromley serving 60 days in jail.144
Not all resisters served jail time for their war tax resistance; some sim-
ply chose to live in poverty. Ammon Hennacy refused to register for the
draft during World War I.145 For his refusal to register, the court sentenced
Ammon to two years imprisonment.146 After being released from prison, he
continued his conscientious objection by refusing to pay tax,147 choosing
instead to live in voluntary poverty, thereby effectively reducing his federal
income tax liability.148 However, he must have incurred some tax liability
because in 1950, the local newspaper called him “one of the city’s most
persistent lone wolf pickets” and reported the IRS had seized Hennacy’s
“Income Taxes Pay for Bombs” sign as partial payment of his tax
liability.149
Congress recognized the existence of religious objectors to war fund-
ing and made provision for them during World War II, creating “civilian
bonds” as the pacifist alternative to the ubiquitous war bond. While the re-
invigorated income tax was the primary basis of funding for World War
II,150 Congress issued war bonds to contribute to war funding. Civilian
bonds were an alternative form of service for those who could not conscien-
tiously buy a bond meant to support the war.151 Thus, the bonds were not
labeled “defense bonds” but rather “civilian bonds.”152 Congress out-
sourced the issuance of these bonds to the National Service Board for Re-
ligious Objectors, a group of pacifists who helped to regulate and sell the
civilian bonds.153
143. WAR RESISTERS LEAGUE, supra note 133.
144. Id.
145. History of War Tax Resistance: 1900 to 1959, NAT’L WAR TAX RESISTANCE COORDINAT-




149. Ruth Benn, Summer Travel: Destination Wisconsin, WAR TAX TALK (July 2, 2014),
http://nwtrcc.org/blog/?p=406 (detailing the author’s review of war tax resistance materials held at
the Dorothy Day Catholic Worker Collection at Marquette University. Day was a war tax resister
as well).
150. Mehrotra, supra note 136, at 183 (“During [World War II], taxes constituted a signifi-
cantly larger percentage of financing [than World War I].”).
151. See History of War Tax Resistance: 1900 to 1959, supra note 145; see also Yoder, supra
note 78, (showing a picture of the AFSC (American Friends Service Committee) version, com-
plete with the slogan “Civilian Public Service. ‘To Substitute Order for Chaos and Creation for
Destruction.’”).
152. MELVIN GINGERICH, Service for Peace: A History of Mennonite Civilian Public Service,
355–58 (Mennonite Central Committee, 1949).
153. The National Interreligious Service Board for Religious Objectors was an organization
comprised of the three historic peace churches: the Brethren, the Mennonites, and the Quakers.
First called “The National Council for Religious Conscientious Objectors,” the group later merged
with the Civilian Service Board and became known as the National Interreligious Service Board
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After World War II, war tax resistance gained traction and in 1947,
250 people attended a conference in Chicago entitled “More Disciplined
and Revolutionary Pacifist Activity.”154 Out of this conference came an or-
ganization of about 40 people calling themselves “The Peacemakers,”155
and refusing to pay all or part of their income tax.156 They published a
newsletter, Peacemaker, advocating the refusal of income tax payment.157
Then, as now, war tax resisters faced legal consequences for their fail-
ure to comply with the Internal Revenue Code. Abraham Muste was an
example of one of these early income tax resisters brought to court for his
nonpayment of tax liability. Muste was a Presbyterian minister and a
Quaker.158 In 1948, he became convinced159 he could no longer pay his
income tax.160 Every year he sent a letter, along with a completed tax re-
turn, to the IRS, explaining why he was refusing to pay his tax.161 One such
letter so clearly expressed what it meant to him, as a war tax resister, to be
complicit with the sin of war in an era of taxation that the tax court quoted
the letter in its decision against him.
The two decisive powers of government, especially with respect
to war, are the power to conscript and the power to tax.
Pacifists recognize that to be consistent they must refuse to
be conscripted for military service or training. I have come as the
result of long reflection and prayer to the conviction that I at least
am in conscience bound, in the present period, under the condi-
for Religious Objectors. It is now called the Center on Conscience and War. See Center Profile:
Center on Conscience & War (NISBCO) (2014), THE PLURALISM PROJECT AT HARVARD UNIV.,
http://www.pluralism.org/profiles/view/73564 (last visited Sept. 25, 2014).
154. William Louis Tabac, War Tax Refusal: Some Code Problems, 20 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 215,
216 (1971) (stating there were 250 attendees). But see WAR RESISTERS LEAGUE, supra note 133
(stating that there were 300 attendees).
155. WAR RESISTERS LEAGUE, supra note 133.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Muste v. Comm’r, 35 T.C. 913, 915 (1961).
159. Id. It is difficult to fully capture what is meant by the Quaker term “convincement,” but
the term encompasses a measure of conversion to a doctrinal truth as well as a feeling of being led
by God to a particular conclusion. The Lancaster, Pennsylvania Monthly Meeting described “con-
vincement” this way: “This is not so much an intellectual assent to some doctrine, but a deep
conviction, based in experience, that God is present in our lives, and moves us to certain actions
and to a way of life congruent with God’s purposes.”  Lancaster, Pa. Quakers, FAQs, LANCASTER
FRIENDS MEETING, http://lancasterpaquakers.org/faqs.html#9 (last visited Sept. 23, 2014). For
Muste to use this term, along with his explanation of a period of prayer and reflection, demon-
strates the sort of training and contemplation the Selective Service Act contemplates when dis-
cussing conscientious objection.
160. A few organizations have agreed not to withhold income tax at the request of income tax
resisters. Muste’s employer was one such organization. It is beyond the scope of this article but
the possibility of corporate income tax resistance may be influenced by the outcome of Burwell v.
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (the claim that a secular, private corporation’s
religious beliefs (or, the beliefs of the corporation’s founders) can alleviate the corporation’s duty
to comply with a law of uniform applicability).
161. Muste, 35 T.C. at 915.
\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\11-2\UST201.txt unknown Seq: 24 27-MAY-15 10:19
206 UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11:2
tions above set forth, to challenge the right of the government to
tax me for waging war . . . .
I recognize that as a citizen it is my duty to strive by “demo-
cratic” means to change laws and policies with which I disagree
and that ordinarily, where no serious issue of conscience is in-
volved, one obeys laws until they are changed. The fact that a
conscription law has been enacted does not, however, lead the
pacifist to the conclusion that he must conform to it until it is
repealed.162
A consistent pacifist would unquestionably also be opposed
in principle to paying taxes which went directly and solely to war
purposes. The same reasoning that would prevent him from firing
a gun at an enemy and would prevent him from thinking that he
was exonerated from guilt if he handed the gun and ammunition
to another soldier to use, would also keep him from paying the
money to make the guns and ammunition.163
Despite the petitioner’s eloquence, the court held the First Amendment
does not prohibit the collection of income tax from pacifists and that the
petitioner was willfully negligent in filing his income tax.164 Nevertheless,
the court held he was not fraudulent in his failure to file.165
In 1949, James Otsuka, an American of Japanese descent and a
Quaker, refused to pay a tax assessment of $4.50.166 During World War II,
Otsuka was subject to the draft.167 He applied for conscientious objector
status and the military classified him as an objector able to serve in non-
combatant service.168 Otsuka refused to perform noncombatant service
within the military, believing he should properly have been classified as 4E,
a conscientious objector required to perform alternate service in an ap-
162. Muste is echoing Thoreau here.
Unjust laws exist: shall we be content to obey them, or shall we endeavor to amend
them, and obey them until we have succeeded, or shall we transgress them at once?
Men, generally, under such a government as this, think that they ought to wait until they
have persuaded the majority to alter them. They think that, if they should resist, the
remedy would be worse than the evil. . . . If the injustice is part of the necessary friction
of the machine of government, let it go, let it go: perchance it will wear smooth—
certainly the machine will wear out. If the injustice has a spring, or a pulley, or a rope,
or a crank, exclusively for itself, then perhaps you may consider whether the remedy
will not be worse than the evil; but if it is of such a nature that it requires you to be the
agent of injustice to another, then I say, break the law. Let your life be a counter-friction
to stop the machine. What I have to do is to see, at any rate, that I do not lend myself to
the wrong which I condemn.
THOREAU, supra note 16, at 7.
163. Muste, 35 T.C. at 915.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. History of War Tax Resistance 1900–1959, supra note 145.
167. Otsuka v. Hite, 64 Cal. 2d 596, 599 (Cal. 1966) (discussing Otsuka’s later claim he ought
to be able to vote, despite his felony record, but the court traces the source of his felony conviction
and so I use it here to describe the fervency of the war tax resisters refusal to comply with “sinful”
taxation).
168. Id.
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proved institution.169 He served three years in the penitentiary for his re-
fusal to comply with conscription to a noncombatant position within the
military.170After his release, the same stubborn refusal to support the mili-
tary in any way drove him to refuse to pay 29% of his income tax, for a
total liability of $4.50.171 He also refused to comply with court orders to
produce his records to the IRS.172 The court sentenced him to a four-month
jail term for tax refusal, increased because of his contempt of court in refus-
ing to turn over his tax records.173
Describing his decisions to resist laws he saw as compelling him to
violate his conscience, Otsuka said:
As a general rule I obey the law. I feel that it is my duty to violate
the law when it involves my conscience, such as a law requiring
racial segregation, or commanding me to enter the armed forces
and kill human beings. When I refuse to obey the law, I do not do
so lightly or casually. It takes all of my faith and courage.174
Although the IRS actively pursued war tax resisters throughout the
1950s and 1960s,175 war tax resistance did not gain nationwide publicity
until 1964, when Joan Baez refused to pay her 1963 income tax.176 Capital-
izing on this new notoriety, The Peacemakers created a “No Tax for War in
Vietnam” committee, which in turn created a pledge stating “I am not going
to pay taxes on 1964 income.”177 The pledge eventually received 500 signa-
tures.178 In 1967, The Washington Post ran an ad signed by a number of
notables (Joan Baez, Dorothy Day, Noam Chomsky, Nobel Prize winner
Albert Szent-Gyorgyi, and publisher Lyle Stuart, among others) who re-
fused to pay income tax.179
When Congress later introduced a 10 percent telephone tax to fund the
military, a mass movement formed around resisting the telephone tax, creat-
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. History of War Tax Resistance 1900–1959, supra note 145.
172. Id.
173. IRS Seizure and Court Actions Against War Tax Resisters, WAR RESISTERS LEAGUE,
www.warresisters.org/convicted_wtr.htm (last visited Sept. 24, 2014).
174. Otsuka, 64 Cal. 2d at 612 n.16.
175. For example, in 1951, Walter Gormley was the first person to have the IRS seize and
auction his car to pay off taxes unpaid due to war tax resistance; in 1957, Jean and Raymond Olds
had their truck and house seized and auctioned; and a number of others engaged in “complete
noncompliance” with the IRS and the courts, earning themselves contempt of court sentences of
up to a year. History of War Tax Resistance: The 1900s, NAT’L WAR TAX RESISTANCE COORDI-
NATING COMMITTEE, http://www.nwtrcc.org/history/history1900.php (last visited Sept. 24, 2014).
176. WAR RESISTERS LEAGUE, supra note 133.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. An interesting side note is that A.J. Muste, whose letter is quoted above, formed and
led this committee. See Muste v. Tax Comm’r, 35 T.C. 913 (1961).
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ing the “War Resisters League.”180 A corollary to the War Resisters
League, the Writers and Editors War Tax protest coalesced in 1967.181 The
528 members (who included Gloria Steinem) agreed to refuse to pay the 10
percent tax.182 By the early 1970s, the War Resisters League estimates there
were approximately 20,000 income tax resisters in the United States and
20,000 who refused to pay the telephone excise tax.183
Interestingly, much of the war tax resistance at this time is not attrib-
uted to the historic peace churches, but was secular in nature.184 This in-
crease was likely due to widespread disapproval of the Vietnam War.185
And at the end of the Vietnam War, the number of war tax resisters
dropped.186 But in 1981, Roman Catholic Archbishop Raymond
Hunthausen of Seattle urged citizens to refuse to pay 50 percent of their
income taxes to protest spending on nuclear weapons.187 Hunthausen’s urg-
ing led to a renewed interest in religious war tax resistance.188
As indicated by the participation of Archbishop Hunthausen, “[w]ar
tax resistance no longer derives its support mainly from the historic peace
sects . . . a wide range of religious denominations actively support it.”189
This mirrors the expansion of conscientious objector status beyond the his-
toric peace churches to anyone with a sincerely held religious belief in the
immorality of war.190
War tax protesters began “altering” their income tax forms, deducting
some portion of their income taxes as a “war tax deduction” or “war tax
180. History of War Tax Resistance, 1960s, NAT’L WAR TAX RESISTANCE COORDINATING
COMMITTEE, http://www.nwtrcc.org/history/history1960.php (last visited Sept. 24, 2014).
181. Id.
182. WAR RESISTERS LEAGUE, supra note 133.
183. Kornhauser, supra note 22, at 954 n.57 (quoting Tabac, supra note 154, and acknowledg-
ing that the estimates are imprecise at best); see also WAR RESISTERS LEAGUE, supra note 133.
184. WAR RESISTERS LEAGUE, supra note 133.
185. Note such “secular” resisters would not qualify under a revised Religious Freedom Tax
Bill.
186. WAR RESISTERS LEAGUE, supra note 133.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Kornhauser, supra note 22, at 955. Today, the Peace Tax Fund lists a number of organi-
zational endorsements, some from historic peace churches, such as the Brethren in Christ of North
America, the Mennonite Central Committee, and the American Friends Service Committee, but
many are from other religious organizations, such as Pax Christi (Catholic), the National Council
of Churches, the Buddhist Peace Fellowship, the American Muslim Foundation, the Christian
Legal Society, and the Jewish Peace Fellowship. Nonreligious organizations also endorse the
Peace Tax Fund, even though alternate taxation would only apply to those who satisfied the con-
scientious objector requirement. Such nonreligious organizations include Veterans for Peace, the
Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom, the National Lawyers Guild, the Green
Party, and three Gray Panthers chapters. For a complete list, see Endorsing Organizations, NAT’L
CAMPAIGN FOR A PEACE TAX FUND (May 13, 2014), www.peacetaxfund.org/endorsements/index
.htm.
190. Borrowing the definition of a conscientious objector from the military and applying it to
the war tax resisters means people holding these beliefs would qualify as war tax resisters under
the Religious Freedom Tax Fund Bill.
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credit.”191 In 1982, the IRS responded by instituting a new civil penalty,
aimed at war tax resisters.192 The penalty was called the “frivolous” filing
fee and provided for a fine of $500 against anyone who altered Form 1040
(e.g., by claiming a war tax deduction).193 The legislative history states:
[T]he penalty could be imposed against any individual filing a
‘return’ showing an incorrect tax due or a reduced tax due, be-
cause of the individual’s claim of a clearly unallowable deduc-
tion, such as . . . a ‘war tax’ deduction under which the taxpayer
reduces his taxable income or shows a reduced tax due by that
individual’s estimate of the amount of his taxes going to the De-
fense Department budget, etc.194
The IRS continued to bring criminal charges during this time in an
effort to collect funds and to dissuade others from resisting, but such collec-
tion attempts were often ineffective. The National War Tax Resistance Co-
ordinating Committee reports ten criminal prosecutions of war tax resisters
since 1980, in addition to a number of contempt charges.195 However, the
War Resisters League reports only three criminal prosecutions.196 The IRS
charged resisters with failure to file or filing frivolous or fraudulent returns.
Courts held some war tax resisters in contempt of court for failure to turn
over documents to the IRS.197 Many war tax resisters continued to adopt a
stance of absolute noncompliance and thus refused to even turn over docu-
ments, not unlike the Hutterite men who refused to fill out the “Statement
of a Soldier.”
In 1984 and 1985, after years of very few seizures by the IRS, the IRS
resumed seizure of property to pay for back taxes owed by resisters.198
About a half dozen automobiles and a similar number of houses were seized
from war tax resisters.199 The number of seizures when compared to the
191. WAR RESISTERS LEAGUE, supra note 133.
192. Id.
193. See Kahn v. United States, 753 F.2d 1208 (3d Cir. 1985). Kahn wrote a letter, which she
attached to her return, explaining her objection to taxes used to fund war and claiming to be a
conscientious objector. She lined through a valid credit line (19b, the Earned Income Credit), and
wrote “46% WAR TAX REFUSED, SEE ATTACHED LETTER.”  The IRS “summarily” as-
sessed against her the $500 frivolous filing fee, which the court upheld. Id.; see also 26 U.S.C.
§ 6702 (2012) (discussed earlier in this article).
194. STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAX. 97TH CONG., 2ND SESS., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF
THE REVENUE PROVISIONS OF THE TAX EQUITY AND FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY ACT OF 1982 277-288
(Comm. Print 1982).
195. IRS Seizure and Court Actions Against War Tax Resisters, supra note 173.
196. For the most part, the National War Tax Resistance Coordinating Committee and the War
Resister’s League agree in their recitation of the history of war tax resistance and this minor
discrepancy is likely due to the difficulty of tracking and reporting criminal sentences, which
would largely depend on the war resisters reporting of the outcome of a particular case to the
larger group, and the difficulty lay people may face distinguishing between a criminal sentence
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total number of tax resisters remains small.200 This is likely because the
amount the IRS is able to get for the seized property when compared to the
effort required to seize the property amounts to a net loss for the
government.
The process of discovering war tax resisters, auditing their returns, cal-
culating the taxes owed, and enforcing the judgments against them is a la-
bor-intensive one for the IRS, made more so by the absolute refusal of
many resisters to comply.201 The process of collection of taxes begins with
an audit, which may be triggered by a resister claiming an inflated number
of dependents on a W-4 form (one resister claimed 3 billion dependents—
the population of the earth—in 1972).202 Alternately, some resisters prop-
erly compute their tax liability, then deduct some portion of their tax liabil-
ity (generally the amount spent by the federal government on “war efforts”)
and pay the reduced amount.203 Often, a letter explaining the deduction is
included.204 This too can trigger an audit.205 Some tax resisters simply
choose not to file a tax return; when the IRS locates non-filers, the IRS will
attempt to compel a filing, and if taxpayers are not responsive, prepare the
tax return for the non-filer.206 The debt, at this point, includes civil penalty
fees for unpaid taxes as well as compound interest for the years of unpaid
tax to present.207 Additionally, fraud allegations are possible for those who
inflate their dependents.208 Those who take a “frivolous” deduction can be
subjected to a frivolous filing penalty of up to $5,000.209 After calculating
the total amount owed by the taxpayer, the IRS will send the resisters no-
tices of taxes owed; after a final demand notice, the IRS will begin the
seizure process, which involves looking for property (usually starting with
bank accounts and progressing to tangible property) to seize and, in the case
of tangible property, auctioning that property with the proceeds being used
to offset the taxpayer’s debt.210
200. Id.
201. Some resisters have engaged in a level of civil disobedience requiring they be carried into
tax court. Id.
202. History of War Tax Resistance: The 1970s, NAT’L WAR TAX RESISTANCE COORDINATING
COMMITTEE, http://www.nwtrcc.org/history/history1970.php (last visited Sept. 24, 2014).
203. How to Resist, NAT’L WAR TAX RESISTANCE COORDINATING COMMITTEE, http://www
.nwtrcc.org/how_to_resist.php (last visited Sept. 24, 2014).
204. Id.
205. Consequences of War Tax Resistance, NAT’L WAR TAX RESISTANCE COORDINATING
COMMITTEE, http://www.nwtrcc.org/consequences.php (last visited Sept. 24, 2014).
206. See 26 U.S.C. § 7203 (2012) (making non-filing a crime); 26 U.S.C. § 6020(b) (2012)
(allowing the IRS to prepare the return for any taxpayers who fail to file their tax returns).
207. See Topic 653—IRS Notices and Bills, Penalties and Interest Charges, INTERNAL REVE-
NUE SERVICE (Dec. 12, 2013), www.irs.gov/taxtopics/tc653.html.
208. See 26 U.S.C. § 7206 (2012) (making a fraud finding possible upon the showing a tax
return contains a “false statement”).
209. 26 U.S.C. § 6702(a) (2012).
210. The IRS Collection Process Publication 594, IRS.GOV, at 4, available at www.irs.gov/
pub/irs-pdf/p594.pdf. (Last visited September 23, 2014).
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Another method of collecting money from war tax resisters is to com-
pel the resister’s employer to adjust the number of dependents claimed on
the W-4 form.211 Rarely, employers refuse to adjust. When the IRS’ at-
tempts to compel war tax resister Priscilla Adams to pay taxes were unsuc-
cessful, the IRS sued her employer, the Philadelphia Yearly Meeting. For a
period, the Philadelphia Yearly Meeting refused to comply with the govern-
ment’s directive to garnish Adams’s wages.212 (The Meeting also refused to
withhold on Adams’s behalf from 1986–1996.) While Philadelphia Yearly
Meeting eventually complied, the landscape for compelling cooperation
from religious organizations (as opposed to individual people) is changing.
Like Little Sisters, Philadelphia Yearly Meeting is a small religiously moti-
vated organization whose primary purpose is to serve the community. The
forthcoming decision in Little Sisters may set a precedent useful to war tax
resisters, especially if the Religious Freedom Peace Tax Bill were to pass.
And in another, similar case, a small intentional community of paci-
fists called The Restored Israel of YAHWEH operated a construction busi-
ness which employed both members of the community and non-
members.213 The company, run by members of the community, refused to
withhold for members of the community who objected, for religious rea-
sons, to paying tax.214 Eventually, both the owner of the business and the
bookkeeper served time for their refusal, notwithstanding their arguments
that their refusal to withhold was an expression of religious freedom.215
This is parallel to Hobby Lobby, which held a closely-held for-profit pub-
licly traded corporation could claim an exemption to a law of universal
applicability based on the religious belief of the corporation’s holders.216
Collecting back taxes from war tax resisters is more difficult than col-
lecting from the typical tax evader. The typical tax evader, when faced with
jail time unless he pays his back-due taxes, is likely to pay, if he has the
money. Not so the war tax resister, who would rather go to jail than become
complicit with sin. The commitment of these men and women to noncom-
pliance with taxation is staggering. For example, consider Randy Kehler,
who, with his wife, regularly reported his income tax liability in full, but
refused to pay the amount owed.217 This continued for 12 years,218 but in
211. See, e.g., Employee’s Withholding Allowance Certificate, IRS.GOV, http://www.irs.gov/
taxtopics/tc753.html (last updated July 16, 2014) (discussing “lock-in letters,” directing employers
to withhold more taxes than the employee is claiming).
212. The Associated Press, I.R.S. Sues Quaker Group, N.Y. Times, July 27, 2003, http://www
.nytimes.com/2003/07/27/national/27QUAK.html.
213. Three Face Jail for Refusing to Pay for War, NAT’L WAR TAX RESISTANCE COORDINAT-
ING COMMITTEE (Feb. 2005), http://www.nwtrcc.org/mtap05/mtap0205.html.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
217. Kornhauser, supra note 22, at 943–44.
218. See Randy Kehler Papers, 1978–1997, UMASS AMHERST LIBRARIES ARCHIVES (Sept.
2005), available at http://www.library.umass.edu/spcoll/umarmot/kehler-randy/.
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1989, the IRS moved to seize the home Randy Kehler shared with his
wife.219 After seizure, the IRS attempted to auction the home, but, unable to
secure a buyer for it at auction, the IRS bought the home.220 A year later,
federal agents arrested Kehler and his wife for trespassing on federal land
when they were found in the home.221 After their release, federal agents
again found the couple in the home.222 Kehler served six months for con-
tempt of court for his refusal to leave the house.223 The IRS finally found a
buyer for the house in 1992, but a group of Kehler’s friends occupied the
home for two months until the group could be removed and the buyers of
the home moved in.224 For eighteen months thereafter, a coalition of anti-
war groups held vigil outside the house.225 After the new owners vacated
the home, Kehler and his wife did not return to it, choosing instead to con-
tinue living with her sister, saying the dispute was never about the house,
but instead, was about Kehler (and his wife)’s refusal to be complicit with
paying for war.226 This sort of tenacity is not atypical of those motivated by
conscience and is part of what makes collecting from war tax resisters so
time and resource intensive.
IV. WAR, TAX, RELIGION, AND THE COURTS
Whether conscientious objectors would be entitled to a conscientious
objector status absent the Selective Service Act—in other words, whether
there is a First Amendment right under the Freedom of Religious Expres-
sion Clause to avoid the draft—has not yet been decided. Seeger, Gillette,
and Welch dealt with the interaction between the Selective Service Act and
the First Amendment (whether Congress’ definition of conscientious objec-
tor satisfied the First Amendment), rather than between a claim of conscien-
tious objection and the First Amendment directly. Thus, we know the limits
set by the Selective Service Act are now sufficient in that the limits do not
unfairly favor one belief system, but it is not clear that the Selective Service
Act itself is constitutionally required.
Because there is not yet a Selective Service corollary to the tax code,
the case law on war tax resistance addresses the question of whether the
First Amendment itself requires some alternative form of taxation for those
who object to tax for religious reasons—and courts have consistently held it
does not.227
219. Kornhauser, supra note 22, at 941.






226. See Randy Kehler Papers, 1978–1997, UMASS AMHERST LIBRARIES ARCHIVES (Sept.
2005), available at http://www.library.umass.edu/spcoll/umarmot/kehler-randy/.
227. Kornhauser, supra note 22, at 962.
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In a very few select cases, the Court has held a particular tax statute is
unconstitutional under the First Amendment. For example, in Murdock v.
Pennsylvania, the Court held an ordinance, which required door-to-door
salespeople to purchase a license, violated the First Amendment. Murdock,
a Jehovah’s Witness, engaged in what the court called “an age-old form of
missionary evangelism”228: that of distributing pamphlets door-to-door. He
asked for a contribution in return, which the borough claimed made the
exchange a sale.229 The court held the fact the borough imposed the license
fee on any distribution of literature, whether religious or not, did not ensure
the fee’s constitutionality.230 However, even here, Justice Douglas con-
cedes, “We do not mean to say that religious groups and the press are free
from all financial burdens of government. . . . It is one thing to impose a tax
on the income or property of a preacher. It is quite another thing to exact a
tax from him for the privilege of delivering a sermon. If the exercise [of
religion] can be taxed then the government is capable of making [the exer-
cise] prohibitively expensive.”231
The Free Exercise of religion, for war tax resisters, involves the re-
quirement that resisters abstain from any and all acts in support of war, up
to and including the payment of tax. War resisters argue, in turn, that the
IRS’ attempts to ensure compliance with the Code make the Free Exercise
of their faith “prohibitively expensive.”
The United States Supreme Court has held the power to tax is a com-
pelling government interest, necessary to the country’s survival.232 For ex-
ample, the Court has said:
The power to tax is the one great power upon which the whole
national fabric is based. It is as necessary to the existence and
prosperity of a nation as is the air he breathes to the natural man.
It is not only the power to destroy, but it is also the power to keep
alive.233
In Lee, the appellee, Lee, argued being required to pay Social Security
taxes violated his religious beliefs. Lee was a member of an Old-Order
228. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 108 (1943).
229. Id. at 107.
230. Id. at 115.
231. Id. at 112. While Douglas seems to be conceding that subjecting “preachers” to the in-
come tax is permissible under the Constitution, which might arguably defeat the claims of consci-
entious objectors that the income tax violates their Free Exercise, Douglas is not considering the
case of conscientious objectors here. For a conscientious objector, the exercise of their religion is
an absolute commitment to nonviolence, including refusing to pay tax if that tax is used to commit
“sin.” Conscientious objectors have proved they are willing to adhere to this believe even if doing
so is costly, including losing their homes, cars, and bank accounts, even going to prison if neces-
sary. However, there are those who are likely being prohibited from the free exercise of their
religious beliefs because of the costly nature of compliance—it has, as Douglas notes, become
prohibitively expensive to exercise their noncompliance with the “sin” of war.
232. Nicol v. Ames, 173 U.S. 509, 515 (1899).
233. Id.
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Amish faith-based community. One tenet of his faith required him to pro-
vide to members of his faith community the sort of assistance Social Secur-
ity provides and to avoid accepting such assistance from the government.234
Thus, he sometimes refrained from withholding Social Security taxes when
employing members of his community. He argued being required to pay
that tax would violate his religious freedom.235
The Court held there was a conflict between his faith and the require-
ments of the Social Security system, but imposition of the tax was neverthe-
less constitutional because of the “overriding governmental interest” in a
uniform system of taxation.236 The Court explained making exceptions to
the Code for individual religions would be onerous; the Court used war tax
resisters in this example, saying the tax system would not be sustainable if
the Court found the claims of war tax resisters valid.237 But Justice Stevens,
in his concurring opinion, stated “In the typical case the taxpayer is not in
any position to supply the government with an equivalent substitute for the
objectionable use of his money.”238
Later, in Hernandez, the Court held the failure to permit a deduction
for payments made by members of the Church of Scientology to branches
of the church for “auditing” was not a violation of the Free Exercise
Clause.239 The Court emphasized the mere fact that a particular tax bur-
dened religious freedom did not make that tax unconstitutional, when con-
sidered against the public’s need for a sound and workable tax system. The
Court was concerned that allowing this particular deduction would lead to
ever-increasing requests for accommodations.240 The Court stated, “our de-
cision in Lee establishes that even a substantial burden would be justified
by the ‘broad public interest in maintaining a sound tax system,’ free of
‘myriad exceptions flowing from a wide variety of religious beliefs.’”241
The Court’s concern for uniformity and workability focused on the
creation of exceptions by the courts, not by Congress. Congress went on to
create exceptions for the Amish.242
Adams v. Commissioner, decided after the Religious Freedom Restora-
tion Act, held RFRA did not require the federal government (the IRS) to
accommodate Adams’s war tax resistance. Adams conceded the govern-
234. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 255 (1982).
235. Id. at 254–55.
236. Id. at 257.
237. Id. at 260.
238. Id. at 262 n.1 (Stevens, J., concurring). Stevens’s comment suggests that were there some
alternate system of taxation for those religiously opposed to tax, then they might demonstrate
compliance by paying into the alternate system, which is exactly what the Religious Freedom Tax
Fund proposes to do.
239. Hernandez v. Comm’r, 490 U.S. 680, 698–700 (1989).
240. Id. at 699–700.
241. Id.
242. 26 U.S.C. § 1402(g) (2012).
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ment’s interest in taxation is compelling, but argued RFRA required a less
restrictive means of furthering that interest and that taxation was a substan-
tial burden on her religious freedom.243 The court was not swayed, holding,
“The least restrictive means of furthering a compelling interest in the col-
lection of taxes . . . is, in fact, to implement that system in a uniform,
mandatory way, with Congress determining . . . if exemptions are to [be]
built into the legislative scheme.”244 The court further objected to the idea
the court should be “involved in determining whether a claimant’s beliefs
are ‘sincerely held,’” expressing the court’s “resistance to court-created ex-
emptions to the income tax system.”245 These last two statements suggest if
the court would have had a legislatively-created exemption (such as the
Religious Freedom Tax Fund) upon which to base its reasoning, and some
other entity was tasked with determining whether the taxpayer was actually
a war tax resister (such as the Religious Freedom Tax Fund would provide),
the court might have held for Adams.
If Congress enacted the Religious Freedom Tax Act, taxpayers would
be in a position to supply the government with an “equivalent substitute”
mentioned in Lee and alluded to in Adams, and for which there is precedent
in the Selective Service Act. Moreover, the burden on the tax system would
not be onerous, since no new exemptions, deductions, or credits would be
created; the existing Code would remain as is but the fund to which the
taxpayer’s money would be directed would change, thus alleviating the
Hernandez Court’s concerns about workability.
While taxation is a compelling national interest, certainly military de-
fense is also a compelling national interest—indeed, it may be a more com-
pelling national interest. And Congress created an exception for
conscientious objectors from military service.246 There is no such exception
for war tax resisters. Were Congress to create an exception for war tax
resisters, requiring payment to an alternate nonmilitary source fund, that
exception would eliminate war tax resisters’ claims that taxation violates
their right to religious freedom. Creation of such an alternative would sim-
ply create a “permissive accommodation,” a power Congress has utilized on
243. Adams v. Comm’r, 170 F.3d 173, 175–76 (3d Cir. 1999).
244. Id. at 179.
245. Id.
246. See Steve Elliot, Selective Service Expands Alternatives for Conscientious Objectors,
ARMY.MIL (Apr. 20, 2010), http://www.army.mil/article/37811/selective-service-expands-alterna
tives-for-conscientious-objectors. (As of 2010, the Selective Service expanded alternative service
options for conscientious objectors for the first time in 25 years, demonstrating a continued com-
mitment on the part of the agency to continuing to provide forms of alternative service for consci-
entious objectors. Said Lawrence Romo, Executive Director of the Selective Service, “Few people
are aware of that second mission [of providing alternative service for conscientious objectors], but
we take it as seriously and devote time and resources to ensuring a just and productive alternative
for men sincerely opposed to war.”).
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several occasions throughout the Code—for example, in exempting self-
employed individuals from mandatory participation in Social Security.247
Most recently, Congress has utilized this power when it created relig-
ious exceptions to the Affordable Care Act, which shows the current Con-
gress’ willingness to consider and adopt such accommodations to laws of
universal applicability.248
Following the Hobby Lobby decision, war tax resisters contemplate the
extension of Hobby Lobby to include war tax resistance. Resisters argue the
Supreme Court found the ACA constitutional on the basis the ACA is a tax.
Hobby Lobby permits tax-payers to claim a religious exemption to the ACA
tax. Resisters argue that sets a precedent for their religious objection to the
income tax.249
While it remains to be seen whether a resister will bring this claim, and
how the court might rule on it, the weakness of the argument is that the
ACA is a specific type of “tax,” while the income tax is much broader. The
Hobby Lobby objection is to providing funding for particular items under
the ACA tax while war resisters object to funding war under the broader
income tax. Hobby Lobby merely sought to determine the boundaries of the
already-present religious exemption mechanism in the ACA. While it is
possible to analogize to war tax resisters, the argument would be much
stronger if the Peace Tax Fund were passed, in that war tax resisters would
then be objecting to a universal tax, which would then have a religious
exemption.
And the majority opinion in Hobby Lobby addresses this, relying on its
previous ruling in Lee.250 The problem in Lee was the lack of an alternate
mechanism for taxation in that it was the collection, segregation, and care-
ful redistribution of funds that was the undue burden; the Peace Tax Fund
works to create an alternate mechanism. And, that is exactly what the ACA
does—creates a mechanism for collection of money from objector organi-
zations, segregates it, and carefully redistributes the funds in accordance
with the objectors’ beliefs.251 Similarly, the Peace Tax Fund would collect
money from objectors and segregate it.
247. Garrity, supra note 10, at 1251. See also DoDI, supra note 116.
248. See 45 C.F.R. 147.131 (exempting religious employers from the requirement to cover
certain forms of birth control).
249. See, e.g., Sarah Ruden, Scalia’s Major Screw-Up: How SCOTUS Just Gave Liberals a
Huge Gift, SALON (July 14, 2014, 3:45 PM), http://www.salon.com/2014/07/14/scalias_major_
screw_up_how_scotus_just_gave_liberals_a_huge_gift.
250. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2784 (2014) (quoting Lee, 455
U.S. at 260).
251. Id.
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V. THE HISTORY OF THE PEACE TAX FUND
Congresswoman Edith Green of Oregon first introduced the idea of a
Peace Tax Fund in 1958.252 Taxpayers would have received up to a 2 per-
cent deduction in their tax liability if they donated to the fund, which Con-
gress intended to be used to support developing nations.253 Next, Quakers,
through their “Peace Committee of the Pacific Yearly Meeting”254 drafted a
bill entitled “The Civilian Income Tax Act of 1961” which would have
allowed war tax resisters to pay their income taxes to UNICEF;255 unsur-
prisingly, this bill did not pass. In 1972, Congressman Ronald Dellums
(CA) introduced the World Peace Tax Fund Act. Professor Joseph Sax
(then on the faculty of Michigan Law School) drafted the act at the request
of the Ann Arbor Friends Meeting. This act would have created a conscien-
tious objector status for taxpayers.256 Some iteration of the bill has been
introduced at each subsequent congressional session.257
In 1977, Senator Mark Hatfield, a Republican from Oregon, first intro-
duced the bill258 in the Senate and remained one of its staunchest support-
ers, introducing it again and again. In 1984, Hatfield stated paying his taxes
was a violation of his own conscience, as he felt it was morally wrong to
use tax dollars to support the arms race.259
The purpose of the bill was, and is, to increase revenue while respect-
ing the religious freedom of conscientious objectors by balancing the com-
pelling need for taxation against the constitutional right to freedom of
religion. Congressmen Mathias and Hatfield introduced a previous iteration
of the bill, and Mathias best expressed the purpose of the bill in saying:
There is no way for conscientious objectors to accommodate both
conscience and country. These are Americans who want to sup-
252. H.R. 12310, 104 Cong. Rec. 7927 (1958). The Peace Tax Fund has been known by many
names, including the Religious Freedom Peace Tax Fund Act and the Peace Tax Fund bill. For the
sake of consistency, I will use the term “Religious Freedom Tax Fund” to emphasize the purpose
behind this bill. See generally, History of the Campaign for a Peace Tax Fund, National Cam-
paign for a Peace Tax Fund, http://www.peacetaxfund.org/aboutus/history.htm (last updated July
25, 2013) (The National Campaign for the Peace Tax Fund phrases the purpose of the bill as
legislation that “would provide a way for persons to participate in the tax system without violating
their conscientiously held beliefs.”).
253. Kornhauser, supra note 22, at 986.
254. See generally About, PACIFICYEARLYMEETING.ORG, http://www.pacificyearlymeeting.org/
about/ (last visited Sept. 8, 2014) (Pacific Yearly Meeting is an organization of Quakers in the
Pacific region meeting annually just as the Philadelphia Yearly Meeting described earlier).
255. See David R. Bassett, The Search for Legislative Accommodation, in FRIENDS COMMIT-
TEE ON WAR TAX CONCERNS, HANDBOOK ON MILITARY TAXES AND CONSCIENCE 105, 109 (Linda
B. Coffin ed., 1988).
256. See id. at 111.
257. WAR RESISTERS LEAGUE, supra note 133.
258. The bill has changed names a number of times. Initially called the “World Peace Tax
Fund Act,” it was later called the “Peace Tax Fund Bill” as well as the “Religious Freedom Peace
Tax Fund.”  For ease of reference, I will call the bill in all its iterations “the bill.”
259. Kornhauser, supra note 22, at 986 n.208.
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port their country but cannot in good conscience pay that portion
of their taxes that is devoted to military spending. The result is
reduced revenues for the Federal Treasury and more headaches
for the IRS enforcement teams.260
Despite the bill’s frequent introductions, Congress has held hearings
on the Religious Freedom Peace Tax Fund bill only three times.261 Most
recently, nearly twenty years ago, the House Ways and Means committee
held hearings in 1995.262 The Senate has never held hearings on the bill.
The bill would solve the problem of collection from people who be-
lieve any sort of compliance is an act of sin and would thus result in an
increase in tax revenue. In 1999, the Joint Committee on Taxation certified
the validity of its analysis—performed in 1992 and 1994—which con-
cluded the bill’s passage would have resulted in a slight increase in revenue
for the nation.263 Nevertheless, the Chicago Tribune reported both the IRS
and then-president Bush opposed the passage of the bill.264 The Joint Com-
mittee has continued to certify that the Bill would increase tax revenue at
each introduction of the bill.265
This certification is consistent with the purpose of the bill as described
by George E. Brown in 1992. Mr. Brown said the Act would “reduc[e] the
present administrative and judicial burden caused when conscientious ob-
jectors feel forced to violate laws rather than violate their consciences . . . .
[T]he Internal Revenue Service will be able to collect full taxes from con-
scientious objectors without difficulty and added cost and strain on the judi-
cial system.”266
Congressman Lewis introduced the current iteration of the Religious
Freedom Peace Tax bill, HR 2483, in the 2013 congressional session.267
The bill provided for alternate taxation for “conscientious objectors” (war
tax resisters) for income tax and estate and gift taxes.268 The bill analogizes
taxation to the draft and points out that alternate service is available for
drafted conscientious objectors but not for taxed conscientious objectors.269
260. 131 CONG. REC. S10296-02 (daily ed. July 29, 1985) (statement of Sen. Charles
Mathias).
261. See Kornhauser, supra note 22, at 989.
262. Id.
263. See Religious Freedom Peace Tax Fund Act, H.R.1454, 106th Cong. (introduced in
House on Ap. 15, 1999).
264. Dustun McNichol, Pacifists Urge Congress To Establish A Peace Tax, CHICAGO TRIB-
UNE, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1992-05-29/news/9202170837_1_conscientious-objectors-
peace-fund-taxes-in-past-years.
265. See, e.g., 145 CONG. REC. E679 (daily ed. Apr. 15, 1999) (statement of Hon. John
Lewis); H.R. 2483, 113th Cong. (1st Sess. 2013); H.R. 1191, 112th Cong. (1st Sess. 2011); H.R.
2085, 111th Cong. (1st Sess. 2009).
266. 138 CONG. REC. 12, 349 (1992) (statement of Rep. George E. Brown Jr.).
267. See H.R. 2483, 113th Cong. (1st Sess. 2013).
268. See id.
269. See id. § 2.
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The bill declares this is contrary to the tradition of religious freedom as
expressed in the First Amendment and as reaffirmed in the Religious Free-
dom Restoration Act.270
Just as the Selective Service Act created an exemption to a rule of
universal applicability and provided for alternate service for conscientious
objectors, the bill creates an exemption to a rule of universal applicability
by allowing war tax resisters to pay tax to an alternate fund—a sort of
alternate service. The bill provides for a fund, called the Peace Tax Fund,
which Congress may allocate to any non-military purpose.271 The current
bill defines military purpose to include: the Department of Defense, intelli-
gence agencies, activities of the Department of Energy which have a mili-
tary purpose, activities of the National Aeronautics and Science Agency,
aid to foreign militaries, and the provision of weapons and training as well
as the funding of the development of military installations.272
VI. IMPROVEMENTS TO THE BILL
A. Change the Name of the Bill to Reflect Its Purpose
First, the bill is currently called the Peace Tax Fund which does not
adequately reflect the purpose of the bill—religious freedom. Thus, the bill
should be called the Religious Freedom Tax Fund.273 This name would
more adequately encompass the purpose behind the bill, which is to support
religious freedom for pacifists while increasing revenue. While peace might
be a pleasant side effect of the bill, the purpose of the bill is to allow consci-
entious objectors an alternate way to pay their income tax, out of respect for
their right to religious freedom under the First Amendment. A name which
more clearly reflects that goal might be more likely to pass.
B. Include an Explicit Renunciation of an Infringement on Congress’
Right to Tax and Spend
The bill should explicitly state that the purpose of the bill is not to
infringe on the right of Congress to exert its taxing and spending power.
The current language of the fund handily, but only implicitly, avoids the
charge that allowing taxpayers to opt in to a religious freedom tax fund
would result in citizens legislating through their tax returns.274 The bill
270. See id.
271. Previous iterations of the bill required the funds to be used to support Head Start and
WIC, but this provision has been dropped. This is likely a good idea, since that requirement calls
into question the constitutionality of the bill as it starts to look like citizens legislating through the
income tax and may infringe on Congress’ power to tax and spend.
272. Id. § 3(b).
273. This was a previous name of a former iteration of the bill.
274. Even if it were true that citizens were “legislating” by selecting where some portion of
their tax dollars would go, such a system is already in place for presidential elections. Taxpayers
may indicate via their tax return that they want three dollars of their tax liability to go to the
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states Congress could use the fund for any other purpose, except for the
military purposes described above.275 Here, the taxpayer is not carefully
weighing her options and selecting among agencies and programs like a
choosy shopper at the grocery. Neither is the taxpayer selecting which pro-
grams to fund or defund willy-nilly like a blindfolded child with a pin˜ata; in
short, she is not legislating through her tax return. Instead, the taxpayer is
simply telling Congress her tax funds should be used for any purpose at all,
except those few described by the bill as “military.” Thus, Congress retains
the power of the purse the Constitution has given it; however, the people
retain their right to freedom of religion through the narrow exception cre-
ated by the Religious Freedom Tax Fund. Stating this more clearly might
better facilitate the passage of the bill.
C. Continue to Make Provision for a Means of Alternate Taxation
The bill must retain its provision for continued taxation while directing
the funds to a non-military fund. Providing a form of “alternate service”
(through taxation) would allow war tax resisters to both pay their taxes and
adhere to their religious beliefs. As Senator Hatfield expressed in 1985, the
Act would “not serve to lessen tax burdens . . . but instead allow people
who are barred by their conscience [sic] to pay federal taxes to once again
join the ranks of law-abiding citizens.”276 The Religious Freedom Tax Fund
would provide the narrowly tailored solution required under the Constitu-
tion and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, drawing a fine line be-
tween the government’s compelling need to tax and the taxpayer’s
fundamental right to religious freedom. Thus, the bill might be more likely
to pass if it clearly stated it would neither eliminate nor lower the tax of
those who seek conscientious objector status.
If the compelling need for national defense can give way to a narrowly
tailored exception for conscientious objectors, then the compelling need to
tax could be treated similarly.277
D. Provide a Reliable Method for Determining Conscientious Objector
Status
The bill must be re-drafted to assuage fears that those who are not
validly conscientious objectors might attempt to misuse the Fund. The
presidential election campaign. While this is a smaller amount than would be at play if the Peace
Tax Fund were to pass, it suggests a greater degree of legislation than the Peace Tax Fund would
permit, in that citizens are dictating what must be done with their money. See generally Garrity,
supra note 10, at 1258–59.
275. H.R. 2483 § 4(b), 113th Cong. (1st Sess. 2013).
276. 131 CONG. REC. 19,601 (1985) (statements of Sen. Mark Hatfield).
277. In the 1992 hearings on the bill, Rep. Andy Jacobs, Jr. sponsored the bill, despite having
served as a Marine in Korea. Miscellaneous Tax Bills and the Peace Tax Fund: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. On Select Revenue Measures of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 102d Cong.
132 (1992).
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Peace Tax Fund as currently drafted merely reiterates the requirement that
conscientious objectors must be opposed to war in any form, based upon the
taxpayers sincerely held religious, moral, or ethical belief as required by the
Military Selective Service Act (U.S.C. App. 456(j)).278 It is then up to the
Secretary of the Treasury to designate a method for determining the verac-
ity of the taxpayer’s conscientious objection claim.279 Previous versions
stated explicitly those who had previously obtained conscientious objector
status would qualify as conscientious objectors under the Religious Free-
dom Tax Fund.280 This definition of a conscientious objector should be re-
tained and expanded to allow those pacifists who have not been drafted281
but whose belief system would allow them to qualify as conscientious ob-
jectors to qualify as objectors to the income tax. The Religious Freedom
Peace Tax Fund bill might stand a better chance of passing if the bill made
clear the conscientious objector designation is not a low hurdle but would
require commitment and effort on the part of the taxpayer to obtain.282 This
could be demonstrated by simply borrowing further from the Military Se-
lective Service Act and requiring taxpayers wishing to register as conscien-
tious objectors to undergo the same examination used by the military. The
conscientious objector must provide proof of the sincerity of his or her be-
liefs, through answering a series of questions designed to determine the
nature and sincerity of the applicant’s beliefs.283
Note that the determination of conscientious objector status hinges on
the applicant showing she is opposed to war in all forms. Thus, merely
objecting to a certain unpopular war would not be sufficient to obtain con-
scientious objector status. Similarly, objecting to a type of war (for exam-
ple, nuclear war) would be insufficient.284 Note too that the bill should
278. H.R. 2483 § 3(a), 113th Cong. (1st Sess. 2013).
279. See generally id.
280. See, e.g., 142 CONG. REC. S3216-04 (daily ed. Mar. 29, 1996).
281. For example, no female conscientious objectors have ever been drafted and thus would
need some way, other than previously determined status as a conscientious objector, to establish
their war tax resistance claim.
282. “Some critics fear that allowing conscientious objectors to assert their status through the
provision of a mere personal statement of beliefs [as was required in the 2003 version of the bill]
would provide non-conscientious objectors with an incentive to exploit this accommodation.”
Garrity, supra note 10, at 1255. Garrity goes on to suggest one potential response to such criticism
is to require the applicant to pay a fee and to bear the burden of proving he or she is a conscien-
tious objector should the IRS determine to the contrary. Id. at 1255–56. However, adopting the
current conscientious objector test would more adequately silence those criticisms since this test is
already in satisfactory use.
283. However, the investment of time required to prove the sincerity of one’s beliefs would
likely deter false claims. See Kornhauser, supra note 22, at 1000 (“Methods could entail enough
time and effort to discourage taxpayers from claiming conscientious objector status unless they
truly want it.”).
284. According to Garrity, one commentator, Karl Manheim, raised concerns that, for exam-
ple, “a group of Muslims” claiming a religious objection might decide “they didn’t want their tax
dollars going to support foreign aid or military aid to Israel.” Marketplace: Peace Tax, NATIONAL
PUBLIC RADIO (Sept. 20, 2002) (comments of Karl Manheim). However, as Garrity points out, this
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require the objector to acknowledge the legitimacy of the income tax,
meaning a person objecting generally to the income tax would not qualify.
(This is probably a moot point, since the money would still be assessed and
collected but simply redirected; hence, a citizen who objects to taxation in
general would be unlikely to seek to pay an alternate tax of equal amount.)
This limitation, as well as the burden of the application, addresses some
commentators’ concerns that passage of the Religious Freedom Tax Fund
would “open the floodgates” to claims of conscientious objector status.285
Just as conscientious objectors might augment this record with letters
from clergy members or family and friends, war tax resisters should also be
permitted to augment their record. And just as the objector is then inter-
viewed by a military agent; under the Religious Freedom Tax Fund, the war
tax resister could be interviewed by an IRS field agent.286
Alternatively, instead of requiring each war tax resister to undergo an
interview, the resister could fill out the written questionnaire, supply the
IRS with any other additional materials, and pay a small fee to receive war
resister status. Once certified, the IRS could do what it does best—selec-
tively audit resisters to ensure they are, in fact, properly certified.
Questions interviewers currently ask objectors, and which the IRS
could co-opt, typically include the following: How and when did you de-
cide against participation in the military? Why can’t you arrange military
service within your conscience? What prohibits you from service? Do you
fear having to fight or to kill others? What books do you read?287
While it might seem odd to have an IRS field agent questioning a
taxpayer’s religious beliefs, the purpose of the questioning is limited. The
field agent does not need to determine the theological validity of the belief;
the agent must only determine that the taxpayer is truthfully representing
his or her sincere and deeply-held religious beliefs. Agents routinely inter-
view taxpayers to determine the truthfulness of their claims in relationship
to their taxes—this new requirement would not be unduly taxing on the
agent’s investigative powers. In a way, this is also like what Immigration
and Customs Enforcement officers do when they interview applicants who
group “would not be covered under the Religious Freedom Peace Tax Fund Act, because these
individuals do not meet the bill’s definition of conscientious objectors.” Garrity, supra note 10, at
n.94.
285. Marketplace: Peace Tax, NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO (Sept. 20, 2002) (comments of Karl
Manheim).
286. While the military’s method of identifying conscientious objectors could be used, thus
saving the IRS the burden of developing such a system, it may not make sense to charge the
military with determining whether an object to taxation qualifies. Shifting the burden to the mili-
tary does not alleviate concerns about government burden but merely protects the IRS from the
burden. To insulate the government from cost concerns, objectors could be required to pay to
cover the cost of their certification so long as there were a provision that allowed objectors who
lacked sufficient funds access to the certification process.
287. These questions are designed to determine how and when the pacifist came to be a
pacifist.
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claim to have valid marriages. Government agents regularly interview
claimants to establish the validity of their claims, so expanding that to in-
clude interviewing conscientious objectors would not be burdensome.288
Additionally, since the investigation of a claim of conscientious objec-
tion does not unduly burden the free exercise of religion and does not in-
volve excessive entanglement with religion,289 extending a claim of
conscientious objection to tax via the Religious Freedom Tax bill would
also pass constitutional muster.
Under the military code, after the initial questioning, the objector is
then interviewed by a clergyperson. It is unwieldy to involve a clergyperson
in the IRS/war tax resister interview process, so this requirement should be
omitted from the Religious Freedom Tax Fund bill. After the interviews and
record-collection, a recommendation is made to the claimant’s commanding
officer—under the Religious Freedom Tax bill, the recommendation could
be made to the Secretary of the Treasury or the head of the local field
office.
The administrative burden of the Religious Freedom Tax Fund bill
would be slight, given the IRS is already engaged in the auditing of taxpay-
ers and investigation of dubious claims (albeit related to tax rather than
religion) and the IRS could simply adopt the military’s system. The burden
to the IRS would also be slight because the number of war tax resisters is
relatively small.290 It is possible more people would come forward as war
tax resisters if there were a legal way to do so, but still, it is likely that
number would be small.291 Even in the Vietnam era, the number of war tax
resisters was estimated to be 40,000. Any administrative cost would likely
be offset by the increase in revenue, as war tax resisters currently refusing
to pay taxes would begin paying taxes. And given the passion of war tax
288. At the 1992 hearings, Treasury officials were concerned about how the IRS was to deter-
mine who was a sincere conscientious objector. Miscellaneous Tax Bills and the Peace Tax Fund:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. On Select Revenue Measures of the House Comm. on Ways and
Means, 102d Cong. 71 (1992). However, using the standard used by the military alleviates this
concern because the standard has already been established and used by government officials simi-
larly tasked with determining the sincerity of applicants for conscientious objector status.
289. See Kornhauser, supra note 22, at 996–97; Garrity, supra note 10, at 1253. As Garrity
explains, the IRS’s role is similar to that of the Selective Service’s role in determining whether a
claimed conscientious objector is sincere, and the Selective Service’s actions are not excessive
entanglement, so, analogously, the IRS’s role would not be excessive entanglement.
290. In 1982, the IRS indicated it was aware of 5,017 war tax resisters and that the number
decreased to approximately 2000 by 1984 after the introduction of the frivolous filing fee. This
number, necessarily, does not include nonfilers of whom the IRS was unaware. The National War
Tax Resistance Coordinating Committee estimated in 1987 there were between 10,000 and 20,000
resisters, including those who chose not to file, and in 1990, that there were as many as 10,000.
However, in 1992, the IRS stated it did not have “good statistics” on the actual number of war tax
resisters but that the number of war tax resisters who informed the IRS that they were resisting
was “relatively small.” And in 1999, the National War Tax Resistance Coordinating Committee
estimated the number of war tax resisters at 10,000–20,000. Kornhauser, supra note 22, at 958
n.75.
291. Id. at 999–1000.
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resisters, most would likely be willing to pay a fee to obtain certification.
The cost to levy judgments against war tax resisters would be eliminated.
E. Maintain the Slight Administrative and Financial Burden
Previous iterations of the bill specifically stated the money deposited
into the Peace Tax Fund should be deposited “in a manner that minimizes
the cost to the Treasury and does not impose an undue burden on such
[conscientious objectors] taxpayers.”292 The bill could be amended to state
that keeping administrative burdens slight is part of the legislature’s intent
in enacting the bill. Additionally, the 2009 iteration of the bill provided that
any revenue generated by the fund should be used in accordance with the
purposes of the fund, demonstrating an expectation the administrative costs
would be less than the revenue acquired, as the bill was expected to increase
revenue.293
The creation of the Religious Freedom Tax Fund would have little
practical effect on war funding. Money is the definition of fungible.294 One
taxpayer directing her tax monies away from funding war will result in
greater proportions of other taxpayers’ money being directed toward war
funding. However, the fact that the practical effect of the Religious Free-
dom Tax Fund would likely be de minimis is largely irrelevant. It simply
means Congress need not fear inadequate funding of the military, since that
funding stream would be met by non-conscientious objector taxpayers. For
conscientious objector taxpayers, who believe war is sinful, the fact that
withholding their tax money from funding war will have little practical ef-
fect would likely be disappointing, but would not alter their argument: they
believe the collection of their tax money, to be used for war, violates their
pacifist beliefs and requires their complicity with sin. That the reallocation
of their money would be largely symbolic is of little concern; religion is, by
its very nature, symbolic.
Additionally, the Joint Committee on Taxation has repeatedly certified
the net effect of the bill would be a slight increase in funding.
292. H.R. 2483, 113th Cong. § 4(a) (1st Sess. 2013).
293. H.R. 2085, 111th Cong. § 4(d) (1st Sess. 2009).
294. See, e.g., Peter J. Reilly, Freedom Rider Asks To Give Peace A Chance - Peace Tax Fund
Act Of 2013, FORBES MAG., http://www.forbes.com/sites/peterjreilly/2013/07/23/freedom-rider-
asks-to-give-peace-a-chance-peace-tax-fund-act-of-2013/. Reilly acknowledges the bill would
have little practical effect and that he believes federal funding for the military is a wise use of
federal funding but nevertheless supports the bill. Garrity gives this example, “Assume that there
are only two taxpayers, A and B, each paying $100 in taxes. Also assume that thirty percent of the
budget goes to the military. Without the peace tax fund, $60 will go to the military (presumably
$30 from each taxpayer), and $140 will go to nonmilitary spending ($70 from each taxpayer). If A
directs that her tax dollars should go to the peace tax fund, the Treasury still receives $200 total
with $60 going to the military and $140 to nonmilitary expenditures. The only difference is that
$60 of B’s money goes to military, leaving only $40 of her taxes for nonmilitary expenditures
because all of A’s tax dollars go to nonmilitary spending.”  Garrity, supra note 10, at n.100 (quot-
ing Kornhauser, supra note 22, at 988).
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F. Introduce the Bill Soon Because the Current Congress and
Administration Evidence a Willingness to Create
Such Exceptions
Despite the concern that passage of the Religious Freedom Tax Fund
would create a “slippery slope,”295 the Code already contains religiously
motivated exceptions to the income tax.296 The existence of those excep-
tions shows Congress is both able and willing to stringently limit exceptions
to the income tax as necessary.
The recent passage of the Affordable Care Act includes religious ex-
emptions. For example, religious institutions are not required to buy insur-
ance that provides for contraceptive care if provision of contraception
violates the religious beliefs of the employer-organization.297 Additionally,
the Affordable Care Act provides an exception for the Amish.298 The
Amish are also exempt from paying Social Security taxes, under the Code,
so long as they are self-employed.299 The willingness of Congress and the
administration to provide these religious exemptions to laws of universal
applicability suggests the time is right for a new introduction of the Relig-
ious Freedom Tax Bill.
G. Remind the Congress That the Bill, Like the Selective Service Act,
Provides a Permissive Accommodation
Whether passage of the bill is required under the Constitution is dubi-
ous at best—at a minimum, courts have consistently found there is no right
to be free from taxation that violates one’s religious beliefs.300 But if Con-
gress passes the bill as a permissive accommodation, then the bill is simply
providing more religious freedom than is required under the Constitution.301
295. This “slippery slope”/flood gates argument is the reason the Lee court refused to create a
court-made exception for Lee. Congress, however, is both able, and seemingly willing, to create
limited exceptions to the Code as evidenced by the current system of exemptions, exceptions,
deductions, and credits, all designed to encourage behavior or better encapsulate legislative values
or goals. Here, this alternative would further the ideal of religious freedom and allow easier col-
lection of tax, both laudable legislative goals.
296. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 107 (2002) (excluding of rental value of the parsonage from gross
income); 26 U.S.C. § 170 (2014) (deductions for charitable contributions); 26 U.S.C. § 501
(2010) (regarding tax-exempt organizations); 26 U.S.C. § 1402(e) (2014); 26 U.S.C. § 1402(g)
(2014) (regarding exceptions from FICA taxes); 26 U.S.C § 3127 (2014) (preventing the quandary
Lee found himself in). Kornhauser, supra, note 22 at 967 – 968.
297. See 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(d)(2)(A) (2014).
298. See id.; 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(d)(2)(B)(ii) (2014).
299. See 26 U.S.C. § 1402(g) (2014).
300. The Muste court even held there was no First Amendment right to exemption from mili-
tary service. Muste v. Comm’r, 35 T.C. 913, 918–919 (1961). Of course, Congress can always
extend additional protections, which is what the Selective Service Act does and which the Relig-
ious Freedom Tax Fund would do.
301. “Such permissive accommodation of the free exercise of religion by the legislature has
long been recognized and was . . . reaffirmed in Smith, even as the case seemed to weaken relig-
ious freedom rights. Moreover, the Court stated such legislation is not only permissible, but desir-
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This is similar to the Selective Service Act. The Court has not explicitly
held conscientious objection is a right under the Constitution but has said
once Congress has created such a right, that right must be enforced in such
a way that enforcement does not violate the First Amendment.302 It is likely
the court would look at the Religious Freedom Tax Fund similarly if a chal-
lenge ever arose. Indeed, Professors Mark Tushnet and Michael McConnell
testified the Peace Tax Fund Bill (as drafted in 1992) would not violate the
Establishment Clause;303 it is unlikely any of the suggestions mentioned
here would violate the Establishment Clause as they deal primarily with
how conscientious objectors should be determined—an issue the court has
examined.
CONCLUSION
At present, the IRS is expending time and resources to track down war
tax resisters. The resisters are putting up significant resistance, refusing to
even turn over their records and requiring the IRS to seize and auction their
property, garnish their wages, and compel their employers to alter war tax
resisters claimed deductions to satisfy the tax debt of the resisters. Many
resisters absolutely refuse to comply, risking contempt of court rather than
turning over records, thus delaying and complicating collection for the IRS.
This difficulty in collection results in loss of revenue for the government.
Meanwhile, the resister is trying to avoid complicity with sin, a religious
conviction that only increases her resistance to the taxation itself. The idea
that the government might compel a citizen to violate his conscience is
antithetical to the values expressed in our Constitution. Passage of an
amended version of the Religious Freedom Tax Fund would eliminate this
tension by increasing revenue to the United States while respecting relig-
ious freedom.
able and expected in a society that values religious freedom. Legislatures have long privileged
religion in the tax area, and the Court has specifically approved many of these measures.” Korn-
hauser, supra note 22, at 968.
302. See Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 462 (1971) (Stevens, J., concurring). The
Court has consistently examined the constitutionality of the Selective Service Act, not whether a
conscientious objector status is required under the constitution. See, e.g., Welsh v. United States,
398 U.S. 333, 335 (1970); United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
303. Miscellaneous Tax Bills and the Peace Tax Fund: Hearing Before the Subcomm. On
Select Revenue Measures of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 102d Cong. 182–85, 252–54
(1992).
